CED: According to the latest Transatlantic Trends survey published by the German Marshall Fund (GMF), President Barack Obama enjoys a higher approval rating in Western Europe than in the countries of Central Europe. What do these numbers tell us about Central European attitudes toward the United States – as opposed to just Central European attitudes toward President Obama?

Dr. Gati: First, the survey covered only four of the ten countries in the region. These countries were Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Six of the new members of the EU were not polled. It is true that the two largest countries were included. Together, the two of them are larger than the remaining eight. So perhaps the results are typical, perhaps they are not typical. It is a little hard to say.

Second, foreign affairs are not as important to the general population in Central and Eastern Europe as outsiders tend to think. Very few people there get up in the morning to check the news about global warming or NATO’s latest activities. The only country where there is considerable interest in foreign affairs is Poland. But it is not typical in this respect. Meanwhile, most people in the region are occupied with economic issues, with issues of national identity, with minority issues, as well as many local issues.

Now the question itself. It is, I think, true that many in the United States believe that the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are not as much needed as before and – this goes to the heart of your question – that many in the region believe that they don’t need us as much either. I think it’s a natural development.  If we get terribly excited about this, then we do a terrible disservice to Central Europe, as well as ourselves.

The fact of the matter is that the EU is there. The EU has provided the region with a great deal of economic support, particularly in Poland. Likewise, the young people of Central and Eastern Europe can attend West European universities practically free of charge. So this distance – what I’ve called last year “the faded romance” between the region and Washington – has come about primarily because of the greater appeal of the European Union. It’s not a catastrophe for the United States. I would add, however, that it’s not so much our policies but our attitudes that have offended some officials, and some of the people, in the region.

Last year, a high official from one of the new members of NATO came to Washington. And in a discussion with a high U.S. official, this person mentioned how pleased his country was to help American interests in Iraq. The American official objected strongly, saying, “That was not an American interest but a common interest.” To which the Central European official said, “That may well be, but we did it in order to please the United States.” The American official didn’t let go of the topic. And so in the end the official from Central and Eastern Europe got up, saying that he had another appointment to attend and the meeting ended.

In other words, we have displayed, particularly during the Bush years, the characteristics of the “ugly American” in our efforts in that part of the world. This is also the case with the kinds of ambassadors we send to Central Europe who know nothing about the region. At best, they do no harm. But seldom do they do some good.

I can’t understand why ambassadorships are exempted from the Federal Government’s rule on professional qualifications. Would anyone go to a dentist because that dentist supports his or her favorite political party?

CED: Despite the structural challenges to America’s relations with Central Europe, the GMF poll numbers also show an improvement in attitudes toward both the United States and the president compared to the last survey during the Bush era. Doesn’t this indicate that things are getting better rather than worse?

Dr. Gati: Well, it’s hard to say better or worse. I don’t think that one should look at every number as if it were the answer to what we already know, or should know by experience, by traveling, by talking to officials. Polls constitute only one of many important inputs.

I am somewhat discouraged that Obama’s numbers jumped more in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. But the differences are not that great. I didn’t lose any sleep over the GMF poll.

CED: One issue of great concern for the region was last year’s Russia-Georgia conflict. However, in a November 2008 article you wrote, “Unless the Georgia crisis turns into a game changer, Central Europe’s romance with the United States will come to an end.” Has Georgia turned out to be a game changer?

Dr. Gati: Absolutely not. Maybe it should have. But it didn’t. The reason for that has to do with the complexity of the crisis. Different analysts come up with different conclusions. My own conclusion is that the crisis was primarily Russia’s fault. They were the aggressors. But I would also blame Georgia and the United States. So maybe, if you wanted to attach numbers, here are my numbers: I would say the Russians were at fault at 60-70 percent and the Georgians perhaps 20 percent. The United States was at fault for not clarifying the issues in an unequivocal way to the Georgians, and perhaps the Russians as well. I would give us 10 percent of the blame.

But that is only one aspect. The other aspect is that our allies in Western Europe did not consider the issue a game changer. And I think most Americans, overburdened as they are with many other obligations in different parts of the world, did not look for another fight. Keep in mind as well that Georgia not a member of NATO or the EU. For most West Europeans, what the Russians did was terrible, but it was certainly not a game changer.

CED: Some have looked upon the president’s recent reversal on the ballistic missile defense shield as a sign of increased disengagement from Central Europe. Do you think this decision accelerates the perceived trend – that a widening rift is emerging between Central Europe and the United States?

Dr. Gati: This is a very serious issue. Again, it affects not all of Central and Eastern Europe, but Poland and the Czech Republic. You are right to ask about perceptions, because the three Baltic States, and maybe to a lesser extent Romania, wonder what is behind the decision. I think if the Obama Administration works out some arrangements with the delivery of Patriot missiles to Poland, then this issue about missile defense will disappear. After all, missile defense had nothing to do with the defense of Central and Eastern Europe from Russia. It had to do with Iran.

In my view, the Obama Administration’s decision – which I support – had to do with two factors. It had to do with cost – missile defense is very expensive – and technology. The technology is unproven.

Now the consequence of what the Obama Administration did – and of course in foreign policy you always have to think about consequences – was to influence the perceptions in Central and Eastern Europe about the United States. This is a part of the world where being abandoned or betrayed is constantly on the minds of the people and their leaders. But to bring up analogies with Yalta – or Malta – is an absurdity. There was no deal here. Obama might have said to the Russians that he was thinking about moving missile defense elsewhere, and the Russians replied: “Well, removing missile defense will make it unnecessary for us to put our own missiles in Kaliningrad.” If that’s a deal, it might have happened. But we didn’t do this to appease Russia.

In fact, the Polish government’s reaction was very cool, very calm, very tempered. Conversely, the Kaczyńskis, and PiS, and people further to the right – they always assume that there is a conspiracy. When they were in power, they were always talking about “układ” (deals) – that suggested that the whole world was against Poland.

But the Cold War is over. Russia is a weak country. It is gradually loosing Central Asia to China. It is losing the Far East to China. Even Belarus is looking to the West. Russia has an economy that has strength only in resources. I’d like to know, what are we so worried about? Let’s stand by Ukraine and let’s build the Nabucco pipeline. Let’s penalize them for belligerence and reward them for good behavior. The wisest thing to do would be to put Russia on the back burner and wait until it’s ready to do what it will eventually do – maybe in my lifetime: Turn West.