Executive Summary
In the wake of Washington’s September 2009 policy shift on European missile defense, U.S. allies in North Central Europe have expressed concerns about the stability of their regional security environment and the ability of NATO to provide for their territorial defense. This has prompted a debate in the Alliance about the validity of Polish, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian threat perceptions of Russian and the nature and enforceability of Moscow’s revisionist designs in the region. Notably absent from this discussion is a recognition of the costs that insecurity among geopolitically-exposed NATO and EU member states could pose, irrespective of the merits of the underlying threat assessment. Avoiding these costs is in the U.S. national interest, and the United States should act now to inoculate alliances against further erosion and strengthen regional stability.
Competition and Instability
The Obama Administration’s decision to abandon plans for a ground-based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system anchored in Poland and the Czech Republic brought to the fore long-simmering regional fears of U.S. disengagement and doubts about NATO’s efficacy as a security guarantor. The decision reinforced previous demonstrations of receding U.S. regional interest that included a subdued response to the August 2008 Georgia War and abated support for NATO enlargement. Concerns were further heightened by marked increases in Russian revisionist rhetoric and behavior (e.g., the 2007 Russian withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 2008 Medvedev Doctrine and 2009 Open Letter to Ukraine) and aggressive Russian regional posturing (e.g., the 2008 invasion of Georgia, 2008-2009 Ukraine gas cutoff and 2009 Russia-Belarus military exercise).
Collectively, these events have fueled the perception that the space between NATO and Russia could be entering into a new era of geopolitical competition and instability. In response, U.S. allies in North Central Europe have called for renewed Western security investments in the form of contingency planning, bolstered provisions for territorial defense and the transfer of NATO military assets and personnel.
Coming ahead of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, these calls for “strategic reassurance” have sparked debate in the Alliance about the security needs of the North Central European region, centering on the question of whether Polish and Baltic-State threat assessments vis-à-vis Russia are accurate. Analysts and policymakers who view Russia as a declining power with negligible regional force capabilities discount new-member concerns; those who see Russia as a revisionist power with regional disruptive potential do not. Overlooked in this discussion is the detrimental effect that insecurity among Central European allies could itself have on the Alliance and U.S. national interests irrespective of the nature of Russian capabilities and intentions.
Five Hidden Costs of Insecure Allies
Unaddressed anxiety among exposed NATO member states of North Central Europe is ultimately unhealthy for the United States, the Atlantic Alliance and European integration.
1. Insecurity in Central Europe fuels division in NATO and the EU. A perception emerged following the Bush Administration that enhanced U.S. security investments in Central Europe would exacerbate divisions in Europe by perpetuating special bilateralism within the Alliance. In fact, the opposite may be true: It is the absence of a convincing security guarantee in Central Europe that may act as the greatest stimulus to intra-European strategic divergence and political disunity. EU Member States whose basic security needs are satisfied possess the confidence to invest in the “normal” politics of integration. Members lacking this assurance are more likely to focus exclusively on the pursuit of hard power guarantees. The less these needs are met, the louder the vulnerable members will likely become, thereby highlighting their strategic dissimilarities with more secure members and reinforcing their sense of political exclusion.
2. Insecure allies are less likely to support U.S. and NATO military missions. On a per-capita basis, Poland, the Czech Republic and their Central European neighbors have been some of the most generous contributors to U.S. and NATO out-of-area operations. They were among the first to respond to the winter 2009 U.S. surge with pledges of reinforcements and currently have 5,900 troops in Afghanistan. These and other contributions have definitively refuted claims made during the 1990s NATO enlargement debates that these states would be net consumers of, and not contributors to, U.S. global security. With changes in the regional security landscape, the perceived need for territorial defense has increased. Unless this need is met preemptively, in an Alliance context, exposed states may be tempted to over-invest in traditional defense capabilities at the expense of out-of-area assets and training, thereby potentially depriving the United States and NATO of support in future crises.
3. Insecure allies are more likely to pursue assertive regional policies. In the absence of convincing security assurances, North Central European states could be tempted to pursue bolder foreign and defense policies – both as a form of strategic self-help and to attract attention to regional issues within the Alliance. Evidence of this tendency can arguably be seen in the 2008 Sikorski Doctrine as a Polish corrective and corollary to the Medvedev Doctrine. NATO member states should not feel compelled to invest in preventive self-help strategies, which may be viewed as provocative in Moscow, resulting in an assertive regional stance which in turn fuels deeper anxieties in Poland and the Baltic States.
4. Insecure allies are poor role models. Developments among the new EU Member States of Central Europe are closely monitored by former Communist states further east, politically, economically and in security. The robustness of U.S., NATO and EU security commitments to, and reciprocal trust from, the countries of Central Europe is widely viewed as a barometer for the health and credibility of the West in the post-Soviet space, irrespective of these countries’ aspirations for NATO membership. If security linkages are perceived as weak or fraying, political elites in the East are less likely to risk pro-democratic Western policy agendas.
5. Insecurity in Central Europe fuels insecurity among geopolitically-exposed U.S. allies in other regions. North Central Europe is not the only region where small and mid-sized U.S. allies sit atop a regional fault line in close proximity to a historical aggressor state or potential revisionist power center. Exposed states in global hinge points such as the Middle East and East Asia closely monitor Washington’s security relationships in Central and Eastern Europe for cues on the future reliability of the U.S. security link to their own neighborhood. Should these states perceive a trend toward U.S. global retrenchment, they could re-evaluate their own strategic options, creating conditions that with time could contribute to the gradual reactivation of old regional security dilemmas.
The Modest Costs of Reassurance
Avoiding the negative effects of insecurity in North Central Europe should be a priority for U.S. policymakers. Strategic reassurance can take many forms. Washington need not adopt a policy of confrontation toward Russia. The emphasis should be on developing a package of instruments, including but not limited to military reassurance, which strengthen the embeddedness of regional states in Western institutions.
1. Contingency Planning for the Baltic States. One of the drivers of North Central European insecurity has been the reluctance of NATO to develop contingency plans for the defense of the Baltic States. The U.S. Administration is to be applauded for calling attention to this deficit in President Barack Obama’s April 2009 Prague speech. That the Alliance is now fulfilling its pledge to establish credible security provisions for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is a positive step that will go far in reassuring NATO’s easternmost members. A strong new Strategic Concept for NATO that complements the current emphasis on out-of-area operations with a reinforced commitment to territorial defense would further assuage regional concerns.
2. Heighten security exercises in North Central Europe. Poland and the Baltic States have expressed anxiety over recent Russian-Belarusian military exercises held close to their borders. The war games, which were the largest in 10 years, simulated a conflict with an enemy resembling NATO and included an amphibious landing on the coast of a ‘potential aggressor’ widely regarded as representing Poland. The absence of a NATO response to the exercises worried regional capitals. Holding training maneuvers in North Central Europe, such as the planned U.S.-Baltic “Sabre Strike 2010” exercise scheduled to take place in Latvia in October, is the correct and appropriate response. To achieve greater impact, NATO should find ways to include other regional stakeholders in the exercises, such as the Nordic countries, and enact current plans to hold them recurrently.
3. Redouble efforts at NATO enlargement in the North. Political deadlock over NATO expansion to the East has strengthened the perception of crisis in the Alliance. With Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Ukraine and Georgia unlikely for the foreseeable future, political energy should be channeled northward to Sweden and Finland. Though traditionally neutral, both countries have become more open to NATO membership in the aftermath of the 2008 Georgia War. Shoring up the northern shoulder could rally the Alliance around a practical and achievable goal and would help the Baltic States feel less exposed, bolstering regional confidence and adding new strategic depth NATO.
4. Broaden U.S. regional relations. Strategic reassurance should also encompass the economic and political spheres. Relations between the United States and its partners in the region have tended to be project-based, focusing on short-term or ad hoc cooperation in response to unfolding opportunities or crises. Both sides would be better served by greater continuity through longer-term exchanges that broaden relationships beyond hard security. A regular forum is needed through which regional allies can engage the United States and discuss a wider spectrum of issues. One option would be to create a U.S.-Polish and/or U.S.-Czech Working Group, based on the example of the existing U.S.-Japan Working Group.[1] Another is to embed U.S. liaison officers in Central European military establishments. This human-to-human interaction, long a feature of U.S.-West European relations, would increase horizontal contact at less cost or controversy than the provision of equipment.
5. Invest political capital in regional initiatives. The U.S. Administration has called for new NATO members to exert more leadership in global affairs.[2] Central European capitals are responding by attempting to flex their muscles, but regional proposals are not receiving sufficient attention from their Western partners. The United States can remedy this by investing political capital and promoting projects led by Central European states, such as Polish, Hungarian and Czech designs to revive the Visegrad Group and Poland’s call to re-launch the Community of Democracies. Furthermore, it is likely that Poland will concentrate on reinvigorating the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) during its 2011 Presidency of the EU. U.S. support and engagement could give more clout to Poland’s aspirations, providing a needed reminder of American backing for European integration and creating a constructive, EU-focused outlet for regional self-help.
6. Transfer NATO military assets to North Central Europe. Finally, the United States should identify opportunities to field alliance military assets on the territory of newer member states. Where appropriate, U.S. military planners should consider low-intensity basing options such as relocating NATO headquarters and training facilities (e.g., the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels or the Joint Multinational Training Command Center in Grafenwöhr) and through rotation of equipment and prepositioned fuel and ammunition stores. Besides bolstering regional confidence, moves of this kind could prove to be a cost-effective risk mitigation tool, discouraging instability or conflict on Europe’s periphery by demonstrating U.S. seriousness and a commitment to the region.[3]
Conclusion
Improving U.S. relations with Central Europe would require a comparatively modest allotment of resources, but would garner significant long-term gains by ensuring allied solidarity and preventing tremors along a historical geopolitical fault line. Ignoring allied security concerns will simply defer the need for strong U.S. and NATO engagement to later, and cost more politically and economically down the road. The United States has the opportunity to repair its damaged image and lay the groundwork for a lasting institutional partnership, ensuring stability and confidence of valuable allies on NATO’s eastern flank. The costs of addressing this issue proactively are small compared to the potential risks of allowing allied concerns to fester or remain unaddressed.
[2] Vice President Joseph Biden called for Central European leadership in his October 2009 speech in Bucharest; available at:
[3] Corroborated by the findings of the May 9, 2005 report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States.
A. Wess Mitchell is president of the Center for European Policy Analysis. |
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