Europe's Colder Half
By: Michael Wyganowski
Published in: THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Date: July 16, 2006
Blame it on global warming, but meteorologists say that Central Europe’s winters are getting colder. And this winter (or one like it in the not-so-distant future), as the Danube freezes over and Warsaw is blanketed under heavy snow, 100 million people – citizens of the European Union’s newest member states and proven allies of the United States – could find themselves without heat.
This is the nightmare scenario that countries in the region – all of which are heavily dependent on Russian gas for winter fuel – could someday confront if they side against Moscow on a major international policy issue.
First, Central Europeans have good reason to doubt the reliability of Russian energy supplies. Unlike Western Europe – where Russian gas shipments have never been interrupted – Moscow has used turn-offs as a policy instrument in Central Europe on numerous occasions. In the Baltic countries alone, Russia cut supplies eleven times in the 1990s in an unsuccessful effort to thwart self-rule. While viewed in the West as a first, the recent energy crisis in Ukraine was therefore just the latest in a long series of politically-motivated interruptions.
Second, in light of this history, Central Europeans can’t be faulted for doubting the claim that Russian energy policy is primarily economically-motivated. While Putin’s decision to increase gas prices in Ukraine was based partly on economics, Moscow is adept at finding other pretexts (in Lithuania, it was “technical difficulties”) for cutting supplies to countries that run afoul of its policies. At the end of the day, Moscow’s controlling stake in energy giant Gazprom translates into a potent and virtually irresistible tool of statecraft.
Russia’s position will be further strengthened by the completion of a Baltic pipeline to Germany, enabling it to cut gas to, say, Poland, without affecting Western Europe. Counting on Russia to forego the use of such levers in a future political feud requires a degree of faith that Central Europeans cannot be expected to possess.
But even if Central Europe’s fears about Russian energy policy are warranted, should the United States care and what, if anything, can we do about it?
The answers are yes and a lot. America has a clearer-cut stake in Central European energy than is commonly supposed and stands to lose a great deal if these countries fall prey to Russian intimidation. As their participation in the Iraq War demonstrates, the countries of “New Europe” count among America’s most reliable allies. Should they be coerced into a position of neutrality or even opposition to America, Washington would lose important partners at a moment when U.S. allies are in short supply.
America’s leaders must wake up to Central Europe’s vulnerability in energy and the risks it poses to U.S. interests and develop a stauncher policy of support for our allies in the region. Three steps are needed.
First, Washington must signal to Moscow that the use of energy as a political weapon against its allies will be met with a firm response from the United States. While the Vice President’s speech in Vilnius was a step in the right direction, it was not enough; U.S. leaders must repeatedly stress American support for Central European capitals in their quest for an energy relationship that is free of “monopolies, price-fixing or blackmail.”
Second, the U.S. State Department should publicly respond to the Polish government’s call for a new Euro-Atlantic energy organization. Three months have passed since Warsaw announced this proposal without comment from Washington. Even if a new “Energy NATO” is an idea whose time has not yet come, the United States should indicate an interest in exploring this initiative.
Finally, Washington must work with Central Europeans to develop a game-plan for preventing a major, Ukraine-style energy move against a regional ally. While America cannot mitigate Central European dependence on Russian gas, it can encourage regional initiatives making it harder for Moscow to strong-arm individual countries – such as the new effort to create a network of inter-linking pipelines for back-up in the event of an interruption. Lending support to this initiative – which resembles an embryonic regional version of the International Energy Agency – would help insulate U.S. allies against Russian “cherry-picking” and create a template for cooperation at a wider, Euro-Atlantic level.
Though only a beginning, taking steps like the ones outlined above will bring greater coherence to U.S. policy and demonstrate America’s solidarity with its allies in the region. Doing so now – in the weeks leading up to the G-8 summit – could help ensure that Central European winters aren’t made colder by a lack of Russian gas.
Michael Wyganowski is Executive Director of the Center for European Policy Analysis, a newly-created think tank in Washington devoted to the study of Central Europe.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.