Merkel's Momentum: Grading the German EU Presidency

By Wess Mitchell
Published in: ATLANTIC COMMUNITY
Date: June 26, 2007

Few days remain until the end of the 2007 German Presidency. During Berlin’s six months at the helm, Chancellor Angela Merkel had hoped to accomplish an ambitious agenda that included re-energizing Europe’s relations with America, re-calibrating its ties with Russia, and re-starting the integration project – a tall order, even for Europe’s most powerful country. Though it is too soon to say how much Germany achieved, the early report card is in and the grades are good.

Re-energizing transatlantic relations. Grade: A.
The German Presidency did much to dispel the view that the EU is intrinsically hostile to American interests. One of Merkel’s first acts was to propose a loosening of barriers to transatlantic trade and investment. More important was what she didn’t do: launch a full-court press on the packet of issues on which Americans and Europeans disagree. This time last year, then-EU President Austria was haranguing Washington about Guantanamo Bay. Many Germans wanted Merkel to do the same on CIA overflights and missile defense. Her decision to downplay these disagreements and focus on common interests has given U.S.-EU ties their biggest boost in a decade.

Re-calibrating ties with Russia. Grade: A.
Anyone who paid close attention to Merkel’s Strasbourg speech in February will have noticed an important change in temperature toward Russia. Gone was the lip service about “strategic partnerships” that has become a ritual of the rotating presidency. In its place, Merkel pursued a confident, interests-based approach – evidence of which was on display at the EU-Russia summit in Samara. Taking this path required Merkel to defy her own Foreign Ministry, which wanted to make a no-questions-asked, 1970s-style “Ostpolitik” the centerpiece of the Presidency.

Re-starting integration. Grade: B.
If Merkel gets a lower mark on Europe, it is not for lack of effort. Two summers ago, few would have predicted that the Constitution would be back on the agenda in just two years’ time. That Merkel was able to make this happen is a testament to her skill in charming feet-draggers. The problem is that Merkel thought the Constitutional test was in arithmetic, while Warsaw wants to make it calculus.

In all three areas, the arrival of a strong, Atlanticist German leader in the EU cockpit could not have come at a better time. And in all three, converting Merkel’s momentum into something more permanent depends on what Germany does in its east. The Foreign Ministry is right that Berlin needs a new Ostpolitik, but wrong about which country it should focus on. What Germany needs is a deepening of ties, not with Russia, but with Poland. Think of it as Ostpolitik lite. Such a rapprochement is long overdue and deserves the same degree of seriousness that an earlier generation of German leaders gave to reconciliation with France. Nothing would do more to remove lingering tension between “old” and “new” Europe, create a united front toward Russia, or facilitate progress on integration. But the initiative is not going to come from Poland; it has to come from Germany. It is going to require a generation’s worth of political will; difficult, emotionally-charged negotiations; and a stomach for slow movement under current Polish leadership. In a word, it is going to require maturity. Welcome to great power status. High school is over.

Wess Mitchell is Director of Research at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a policy institute devoted to the study of Central Europe.

 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.