No Ally Left Behind
By Wess Mitchell
Published in: THE WASHINGTON TIMES INSIGHT MAGAZINE
Date: January 9, 2007
Leading members of the incoming 110th Congress say they plan to make reconciliation with Western European countries that opposed the Iraq war a top priority of their first months in office. By regaining the confidence of “Old” European allies France and Germany, lawmakers hope to pave the way for what the Baker-Hamilton Commission called a “New Diplomatic Offensive”—an eleventh-hour drive to enlist international support for any revamped war strategy and defray the political costs of an eventual U.S. withdrawal.
Conspicuously absent from these deliberations has been any mention of the so-called “New” Europe—the ten former communist Central European countries that supported the United States in Iraq but which, for some reason, have been excluded from discussions on the future course of the war. Despite contributing more than a third of all non-U.S. troops in the coalition—2,200 of which are still on the ground—Central European countries were not mentioned, either in the Iraq Study Group report or in leading legislators’ plans for an “Iraq Contact Group.” In Warsaw, Budapest and Prague, this apparent unwillingness on Washington’s part to consult its wartime partners has raised questions about the ability of medium-sized allies to influence the United States at the strategic level and cast doubt on Central European efforts to obtain U.S. support for regional goals and interests under the new Congress.
From the beginning, many Central Europeans have suspected that America’s flirtation with the “New” Europe would evaporate once the war ended—at which point, Washington would revert to its usual focus on the “real players” in Western Europe. This suspicion seemed to be confirmed during the proceedings of the Baker-Hamilton Commission, when, as one Polish observer said, “Nobody even asked for our input.” In the end, France and Germany were included in the final report, while Poland—which administered an entire quarter of Iraq during the occupation—was not. To Poles, the message from Washington was clear: “send us your troops, but don’t expect a place at the table when the war is over.”
In light of their diminishing strategic profile, many Central European diplomats fear that it will be more difficult to obtain the support—or even attention—of U.S. policymakers in addressing issues of concern to the region’s powers. Under the previous Congress, Central European allies were—as one Czech diplomat put it—“always treated as the favored child,” but the consensus now is that they will be net “losers” in the new scheme of things. Some worry that the new crop of lawmakers will be slow to act on President Bush’s promise—made at the NATO summit in Riga—of Central European inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. Others worry that the new Senate Foreign Relations Committee will be less inclined than its predecessor to confront Russian assertiveness in the energy sector—an issue on which outgoing Chairman Richard Lugar favored a tougher U.S. stance than we can expect from incoming Chairman Joseph Biden. As one Polish analyst put it, “there is a fear that, because of the elections, we’ll be left in the lurch in areas where we need an active U.S. voice—especially on Russia.”
In sum, Central Europeans are watching closely to see how far their “stock” falls, now that the new leadership is in office. Should their concerns prove warranted, and Washington be seen as neglecting its smaller allies, America’s image could be tarnished—in Central Europe and beyond. The perception that Washington’s wartime blandishments had been a bait to recruit support for the war could raise questions about the wisdom of supporting America in future crises, potentially depriving Washington of an important support base in the European Union and vis-à-vis an increasingly assertive Russia. Perhaps most seriously, it could have a demoralizing impact on other allies that are watching from the sidelines. Nothing would be worse for America’s reputation—or its efforts to recruit new partners—than for a U.S. ally like Poland to be seen getting a cold shoulder while Washington makes amends with France and Germany.
For all of these reasons, U.S. policymakers should be careful not to alienate the allies that supported us in the war. To borrow a catchphrase from President Bush’s education policy, the motto on the Hill this January should be “No Ally Left Behind.” For incoming lawmakers, this means not letting pre-election efforts to assist the Central Europeans (like visa legislation) fall by the wayside and taking seriously regional anxieties about energy security. For both Congress and the White House, it means giving regional allies a privileged seat in any other international discussions that are held to discuss the future of the war.
In both cases, the need to preserve America’s alliances is a core U.S. interest that policymakers should be able to agree on, regardless of their political orientation. While taking these steps will not solve all of the problems that Central Europe inherited from the war, it will go a long way towards retaining their support for future crises and help ensure that America’s international credibility remains intact—no matter what happens in Iraq.
Wess Mitchell is director of research at the Center for European Policy Analysis, a policy institute devoted to the study of Central Europe.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.