A New Phase in Hungary's Foreign Policy?

Posted: 01 July 2008

by Géza Jeszenszky

When I ask the question, “Is this a new phase in Hungary’s foreign policy?,” I am not talking about the growing concern over the current Socialist government’s “special relationship” with Russia. Instead, I am trying to steer our understandable curiosity toward discovering what kind of foreign policy objectives a new government led by Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party is likely to adopt.

The March 9 referendum on social and educational issues is a strong indicator that a “new phase” may indeed lie ahead. This referendum was much less about the actual issues raised by Fidesz than it was a very strong vote of no-confidence against Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s ruling party. (The turnout was unusually high for a referendum – 51 percent – and of those, 83-84 percent voted against the government.) Since then, the Socialists’ minor partner (the Alliance of Free Democrats) left the coalition, and Gyurcsány’s minority government is likely to face a resounding defeat at the next election in the spring of 2010. What is more, the country has sunk into an economic morass, and authorization for the measures that will be necessary to escape it can come only from an early election. Such an outcome will occur only if the Free Democrats vote against the budget at the end of the year; which may be their last chance to clear the 5 percent election threshold.

Pundits outside Hungary must understand that the popularity of the Fidesz party and of former Prime Minister Orbán is at an all-time high. Rising to the challenge, Fidesz seems determined to shed all the negative publicity (earned or unearned) that surrounded it in the past. In April, the party unveiled a strategy for foreign relations until 2014 entitled “Consistent Foreign Relations.” The 40-page-long document is the first in a series of policy papers based on the Fidesz party manifesto “A Stronger Hungary” adopted in December 2007 [1].

This Stronger Hungary manifesto is full of encouraging statements. Its most crucial paragraph contains language that could be endorsed by all the political forces of the country: “Hungary’s foreign policy is based on the values proclaimed and protected by the European Union and NATO. The realization of human rights and the rights of national minorities is in the center of its strategy.” Fidesz wants to contribute to the aims and policies of the EU, to maintain a revised Common Agriculture Policy, and to adopt the euro “in due course.” The party is committed to a common policy on immigration, refugees and above all energy. The latter requires a coordinated eastern neighborhood policy (with special attention to Ukraine) and a careful line towards Russia that avoids disjointed bilateral energy deals.

Atlanticism is another key part of the party’s platform; Fidesz emphasizes that the United States is “a most important ally, which guards the observance of human rights and democratic principles, and is interested in the spreading of Euro-Atlantic values.” Hungary’s allies should take Fidesz’s commitment to international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and the party’s interest in the success of the transition in Iraq as strong assurances. Indeed, even at the price of losing the votes of people misguided by the anti-globalization media, Fidesz has unequivocally taken the side of Atlanticism. The Socialists, meanwhile, have shown signs of wavering. For instance, Gyurcsány’s government has openly flirted with the Kremlin by signing a nontransparent contract over the South Stream pipeline, thus making the country even more dependent on Russian energy and harming the Nabucco pipeline’s chances for success.

As could be expected, Fidesz hopes to revive and increase cooperation among the Visegrád Group – Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland. After all, this group was an effective and successful legacy of the Antall government. In addition, Fidesz hopes to direct Hungary’s actions in two other directions: the Danube (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Austria and Slovakia) and the Balkans. Concerning the 2.5 million Hungarians in states neighboring Hungary, a Fidesz government would bolster support for efforts at genuine local democracy and self-government along the lines that have proved successful in Western Europe: that is, using the principal of subsidiarity as a guideline and South Tyrol as a model. Other issues such as terrorism, illegal migration, international criminal groups, environmental hazards and the detrimental effects of globalization are also part of the foreign policy program.

This brief overview of the platform of the major Hungarian opposition party should be reassuring for all observers. Six years in the political wilderness, often facing exaggerated charges inside and outside the country, has taught Fidesz’s leaders many lessons. There can be no doubt about the sincere commitment of the party to the points mentioned. All the leading personalities, including former Prime Minister Orbán, have spoken along these lines in the last few months. They know that one cannot win an election with statements on foreign policy, but their lead in the polls allows them to make a principled stand on those hot spots which have no direct bearing on Hungary but are nevertheless essential for the West.

Géza Jeszenszky previously served as Hungary’s Foreign Minister (1990-94), as well as the Hungarian Ambassador to the United States (1998-2002).

[1] English summary: http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=111892. Full text in Hungarian: http://www.fidesz.hu/download/FideszSzpF1_belivek_148x210.pdf.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.