Bulgaria: Between a Pipeline and a Hard Place

Posted: 15 May 2008

by Dafina Nikolova Doran

Bulgaria has long occupied the volatile “buffer zone” between West and East. Since the end of the Cold War, the country’s political leadership has remained mentally mired in this familiar territory. As a member of both NATO and the European Union (EU), Bulgaria must continuously reaffirm its allegiance to the West, while simultaneously maintaining a cordial relationship with Russia. Moving forward, Bulgaria looks set to reap the benefits of its central location in an unfolding West vs. East game of pipeline politics.

From the standpoint of political psychology, Bulgaria’s attitude towards Russia can be described as mildly schizophrenic; the way Bulgarians look at Russia is molded by the conflicting experiences of, on the one hand, almost fifty years of communist dictatorship, but Russian-sponsored liberation from five centuries of Ottoman rule on the other. This conflict of historical memory is further complicated by a multitude of present-day factors. These include the economic reality of entanglement in Russian energy politics; regional challenges, such as Kosovo’s independence (an issue on which Sofia’s position has solidified in decisive opposition to the Kremlin); and problematic statements by Russia’s political leadership (e.g., former president Vladimir Putin’s implied threat that Bulgaria might find itself on the receiving end of a Russian air strike should it persist in supporting the U.S. missile defense system). On this last issue, Bulgaria’s staunch backing of the U.S. project in open defiance of Moscow is an important indicator of Bulgaria’s chief foreign policy goal to finally side with the winning team, and firmly establish itself as a liberal, democratic, and decidedly pro-Western state.  

To this end, Bulgaria has signed a number of binding agreements with the United States, such as the 1994 Bilateral Investment Treaty and the 2005 Defense Cooperation Agreement, which gave the U.S. military shared use of several Bulgarian military facilities and allowed for up to 2,500 American troops to be stationed on the country’s territory. It dispatched troops to Iraq in 2003 and joined NATO the following year. If there is one overarching lesson that Bulgaria has learned from its Ottoman past, it is how to fall in line and be a good ally, while the big players challenge each other for control of the board.

On energy issues, however, some people speak of Bulgaria as Russia’s “Trojan horse” in the EU. But in reality Bulgaria has little room for maneuver. Besides, it is highly unlikely that Sofia would have signed on to Russia’s “mega project” in the energy sphere – the South Stream natural gas project – without first consulting Washington and Brussels. At present, the yardstick for measuring a country’s commitment to European energy security seems to be support for the Nabucco pipeline.

The EU, in an effort to ensure greater security of supply through diversification, launched the Nabucco pipeline project for a few years ago for natural gas from the Caspian (i.e., Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran). Initially hostile because of the prospect of Iranian gas filling the pipeline, the message from Washington gradually shifted over time to reflect a pro-Nabucco, but continuously anti-Iran, sentiment. Russia’s South Stream is perceived by some as a direct challenge to the Brussels and Washington-backed Nabucco. And U.S. officials have criticized countries for not “sequencing” their support of pipeline projects in a way that reduces dependence on Russia (i.e. first constructing Nabucco, then thinking about other Russian pipelines).

Yet opposition to Iranian gas complicates Nabucco’s chances for success. Realistically speaking, the practical viability of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan as sole providers of a sufficient supply stream for Nabucco is questionable. However, prospects for Iraqi gas open up a new potential backstop for Nabucco, even accounting for Iraq’s existing (and possibly future) supply volatilities.   

Whatever happens with South Stream and Nabucco, one thing is fairly certain: the two pipelines will cross paths in Bulgaria. This would solidify the country’s position as a vital energy hub, increase its strategic importance for Washington and facilitate its future economic development via lucrative transit revenues and capital investments. In short, Bulgaria stands to gain no matter which pipeline wins the race.

A more dispassionate analysis would tackle the question of whether small countries, blessed (or cursed) with geo-strategic importance, possess the luxury of choice in an international arena dominated by the large and the powerful. This certainly applies to the Bulgarian case, both in bygone eras and the present. But thanks to a global energy crunch and political disagreements as to who controls the flow of energy, Bulgaria could find itself for perhaps the first time since its Golden Age in the early 13th Century profiting from its geo-strategic location at the crossroads between East and West, rather than being reduced to simply a buffer between rival powers.  

Dafina Nikolova Doran is a Ph.D. Candidate in Government at Georgetown University in Washington, DC.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.