Central Europe's Next Transition: Thinking Like Players, Not Pawns

Posted: 15 April 2008  

by Denis P. Cosgrove  

On May 7, Dmitry Medvedev will become President of Russia. Like so many times before in their history, the countries of nearby Central Europe will find themselves trying to divine the intentions of a new leader in Moscow. Careful scrutiny of Russian politics is reasonable and necessary for Central Europeans. However, the transfer (or non-transfer) of power in Russia should no longer be seen as a determinative factor for the region’s future. In fact, the current international dynamics of Central Europe strengthen regional capitals’ freedom of maneuver. The time has come to replace the fundamentally reactive foreign policies that states of this region have pursued over the past sixty years with a proactive strategy vis-à-vis Russia and other great powers. Doing so would help complete the evolution of Central European states from regional pawns to players in European politics.

Under the Soviet yoke, Central European capitals were unable to significantly impact the international relations of their region. Today is different. A more complex geopolitical context is returning to the continent after lying dormant during forty-five years of bipolarity. Central Europe sits at the crossroads of two important battlegrounds in the 21st century: the divide between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes; and the Euro-Atlantic community’s contest with Russia for control of Europe’s energy resources. As a result, countries in the region now have greater opportunity for leverage in their dealings with the Russians and Americans, as well as with the EU.

However, Central Europeans are only haltingly seizing this opportunity to advance their interests. Recent missile defense negotiations with the United States are a good example. Poland appears to have won an upgraded air defense system from the United States, but the Poles missed the opportunity to further sweeten the reward for their participation. For example, Warsaw could have tried linking an agreement on missile defense to U.S. financial support on bolstering Polish energy security or a commitment to include Poland in the visa waiver program – an item for which the Czechs and others successfully pushed.

In order to develop into major European players, negotiations on these and other issues must be more regionally cohesive. On major issues, Central Europe must work harder to speak with one voice. Poland’s success in winning modernization, and the Czech’s visa victory, would have accomplished more for the region if they were not bilateral victories but benefits shared across the region. Failing to remain united and extract additional concessions from the United States suggests Central Europeans are finding it difficult to fully relinquish their role as pawns.

There are plentiful examples of states who deftly manage U.S.-Russian tensions, chief among them France and India. France manages to stay connected to the West while occasionally showing flashes of fierce independence. These flashes keep the traditional allies, especially the United States, on their toes and keenly aware of the French mood (even if, as with the invasion of Iraq, it is ultimately ignored). India is a starker example. The resolutely neutral sub-continent nation has played Washington and Moscow off of each other for the last fifty years. And, despite the end of the Cold War, this policy continues. Obviously France and India are less geographically vulnerable and not as reliant on American security as Central Europe; they do not, therefore, represent an example to be mirrored. Nonetheless, the French and Indian diplomatic maneuvers offer lessons worthy, if not of emulation, then certainly of consideration.

By comparing alternative strategic options, Central Europeans can establish a floor price for their adherence to Euro-Atlantic priorities. While there are serious risks involved with this approach, Central European nations like Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary or Romania should be confident of their strategic value: they are the energy gateway to Europe; they are the military gateway to the Greater Middle East; they are willing to mobilize troops for Kosovo, Afghanistan and even Iraq; the region’s economy is expanding with room for more growth; and Central Europe’s ability to influence EU policy is increasing as the union moves east. Thus, Central Europeans should politely demand adequate compensation for their contributions to missile defense, Western-backed gas pipelines or other items. While remaining reliable NATO allies, the Poles and Czechs can lead a region that pursues its own interests first and satisfies Western powers second (this is made easier by the fact that the two are often largely linked). Though unseemly, this would be thinking like a player, not a pawn.

In such a context, Medvedev is not someone to be feared, but an opportunity to be exploited. If the new Russian leader turns out to be less frosty than Mr. Putin in his relations with Central Europe, then the region will enjoy a plausible alternative to its unwaveringly Western orientation. A few successful summits with Medvedev’s Russia would send a clear signal that Central Europe is no longer to be taken for granted by the United States or EU heavyweights. Such an effort requires sophisticated diplomacy, but it is by no means impossible. So let the dissection of the new Russian president continue. But let it be conducted not in search of how Mr. Medvedev intends to use Central Europe, but rather how Central Europe might best use Mr. Medvedev.

Denis P. Cosgrove is a CEPA Associate Scholar and a consultant based in Washington, DC.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.