How to Respond to Russia?

Posted: 29 August 2008

by Jan Techau

With the diplomatic tit-for-tat after the war in Georgia at full tide and columnists around the globe proclaiming the advent of a new post-post-cold war era, it is high time to come to a few sober assessments.

First of all, the not-so-surprising “new” Russian Realpolitik has made it very clear that, while the West does still exist, it lacks the power to pursue its interests in the Eastern outposts of Europe. This is due to the asymmetric nature of the geo-strategic game in the region. While Russia has all the short-term leverage vis-à-vis its Western neighbors to back up its policies, the West has only long-term answers to this strategy. Most importantly, the West does not have any effective short-term economic measures in its arsenal to counter the Russian oil and gas instrument. Also, America never had any military option to curtail Russian operations in this short war (contrary to common op-ed wisdom, this was not because of Iraq or Afghanistan but because of Russia’s status as a formidable nuclear power). This asymmetry will make it very hard for the West to back up its interests in the region with meaningful action.

If a long-term strategy is the only option for the West in order to gain the leverage to change Russian political behavior, this strategy must be based on the two major factors shaping this policy. They are: (a) Russian fears, and (b) the sources of Russian power.

Russian fears are largely based on a historic inferiority complex that leads to a deep-rooted belief in a grand Western conspiracy aiming at the permanent crippling of Russian greatness. It is this rationale that leads to the crude zero-sum-game view of the world that still frames Russian strategic thinking. Even though this has been known for quite awhile, the West has not tried hard enough to convince Moscow that its policies toward Russia stem from non-hostile motives. Doing so will take a very long time, but it must be tried. If we can’t convince Moscow that the West is NOT seeking to diminish Russia’s status, we will not ever be able to develop trustful relations with this great country. It might help to remind Russia that its Western borders are by far its most stable ones.

While doing this, it is important to understand that the semi-authoritarian regime in Moscow harbors existential fears against all democratic developments in its immediate neighborhood. To be utterly clear: From Russia’s perspective, democracy in Georgia and Ukraine threatens regime change at home. Even though we might well wish for more democracy in Russia, regime change is well beyond the capabilities of the West to accomplish. So while we can’t let down the pro-democracy forces in Eastern Europe, we must understand how the Kremlin’s power clique, based on both traditional complexes and a fear for its political survival will attempt to limit Western influence in the region. More diplomatic subtlety is required to balance these two factors. Part of this subtlety must be the careful dispensing of NATO membership.

Russia’s reaction to further NATO expansion is not even of primary concern here. Instead, we should ask ourselves what the practical value of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty will be if it is granted to countries which the alliance does not have the means (and maybe not even the will) to defend.

Any long-term strategy designed to influence Russian political behavior must aim at the most important source of Russian political strength: Europe’s striking energy dependence. Not only is this dependence empowering Moscow to shamelessly and skillfully play European nations against each other, it also provides the monetary resources for Russia’s hard-headed strategy. But there are two weaknesses in Russia’s strategic posture.

First, its unique strength depends partly on the bundling of upstream and downstream natural gas capacities (i.e., the fact that production and distribution are controlled by state-owned Gazprom). The EU should target this weakness by following the European Commission’s plan to unbundle the two realms. So far, many European nations, including Germany, oppose the idea of energy market liberalization. But it would be a potent weapon against monopolistic Russian mingling in the EU’s energy sector.

Second, Europe must substantially speed up its drive toward non-Russian energy resources. The development of reliable and efficient alternative energies, including the much-besmeared nuclear power, must turn into a top priority. This would entail tax breaks for investors and government-backed research efforts. Apart from being smart environmentally and business-wise, this strategy also constitutes the only hope to uncouple Europe politically from Russia’s energy-boosted influence.

Admittedly, these are not exactly quick fixes for the Russia problem as it is presently manifesting itself. But then we do not have any quick fixes available. Our relative powerlessness is home-grown, the result of disunity. For years, analysts have urged the EU to create a common stance vis-à-vis Russia. It is now more compelling than ever. Europe must go beyond its mostly emotional Old/New divide, and it must get America into the consensus as well. If Georgia was not enough of a wake-up call, then what else needs to happen?

Jan Techau is a CEPA Associate Scholar and the Director of the Alfred von Oppenheim-Center for European Policy Studies at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.