Lithuania's Lonely Gambit

Posted: 15 May 2008

by Ryan R. Miller

At a meeting of EU foreign ministers two weeks ago, Lithuania vetoed a mandate for talks with Russia on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The Baltic republic cited among other concerns Russian energy policies and Russian interference in the Black Sea region’s “frozen conflicts.” But Lithuanian leaders soon realized that they had overplayed their hand; just this past Sunday, Vilnius dropped its opposition after reaching an understanding with the Poles, Swedes and Slovenes. Though the merits of Lithuania’s veto were valid, the timing was unfortunate. In retrospect, Lithuania’s lonely gambit was a bold stone-throw against the Goliath to the East at a time when many in Europe are hoping for a diplomatic thaw with Russia. It now falls to the EU to take Lithuania’s concerns seriously in negotiations with the Kremlin.

The story of Lithuania’s veto dates back to 2006, when Russia cut off oil through the Druzhba pipeline to the country’s sole oil refinery (Mažeikių Nafta), citing technical problems. In reality, according to most analysts, Russian oil companies sought to acquire the refinery for themselves. In May 2007, Lithuanian leaders announced that they would block talks on a new PCA unless Russia restarted the flow of oil. Poland had already said it would block EU talks with Moscow, insisting that Russia lift a ban on Polish meat exports. However, last month, the new government of Donald Tusk in Warsaw officially dropped its opposition after Polish meat issues were addressed.

This left Lithuania as the sole dissenter, but instead of folding, the Baltic republic upped the ante. At the April 29 meeting, Foreign Minister Petras Vaitiekunas insisted that any mandate for PCA talks be strengthened by four declarations: (1) assurances that Brussels will pressure Moscow to lift its oil blockade of Mažeikių Nafta; (2) a reminder of Russia’s obligation to adhere to the principles of the Energy Charter Treaty; (3) promises to seek greater Russian cooperation on a number of criminal cases important to Lithuania; and (4) a commitment up front to assess Russian progress in solving “frozen conflicts” in Georgia and Moldova during negotiations on the PCA.

The first point on Lithuania’s wish-list is long-overdue and should be expected. Items no. 2 and 3 are not that unreasonable. It is the demand on frozen conflicts, regardless of its merits, that seems particularly bold given rising Russian-Georgian tensions. While no Eurocrat supports Russia’s aggressive policies towards Georgia’s breakaway province of Abkhazia, many in Brussels view a new PCA as essential for improving EU-Russia ties, and hope to use the recent Kremlin changeover as a diplomatic opening to bury the hatchet.

Why did Lithuania up the ante? Clearly, domestic politics play a big role: the incumbent government led by the Social Democrats – whose ratings are currently falling – wants to appear tough ahead of parliamentary elections this October. Many Lithuanians are frustrated at what are perceived as Russian attempts to undermine Lithuanian sovereignty by tightening the energy noose. The government’s strong stand plays well to the gallery.

But domestic politics aside, Lithuania can empathize with Georgia’s position. Indeed, in the Baltic region, the sense of vulnerability to Russian pressure extends beyond the energy sphere. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined NATO in 2004, yet Russian military aircraft have since violated their airspace on a number of occasions. The Kremlin has also used ethnic Russians living in these states as a pretext (and vehicle) for meddling in local politics. Some in the region look at what’s happening in Georgia and privately fear that they could be next.

Realistically speaking, Vilnius could not have sustained its veto in the face of EU pressure. This pressure came not only from the usual suspects like France and Germany, but also Latvia, Estonia and other Central Europeans – including the EU’s current chair, Slovenia. Interestingly, the Poles kept quiet at first, but on May 8 it was announced that Poland and Lithuania would “coordinate” their positions. According to official statements, the Lithuanians asked for Poland’s help, and Tusk said he “understood Lithuania’s position.” But it now looks as if Lithuania asked not so much for Polish support on the veto, as Polish help in saving face. Bringing Poland in for consultations set up Warsaw to play the role of an honest broker between Vilnius and Brussels, and provided a dignified way for Lithuania to climb down from its position.

Over the weekend, Sweden – also a Lithuanian ally in EU circles – sent its foreign minister to Vilnius to join his Polish and Slovene counterparts for a meeting with Vaitiekunas. The four ministers issued a statement on May 11 asserting, “We have found ways to reflect in the mandate of the talks the issues of the Druzhba pipeline, issues of legal cooperation with Russia, and frozen conflicts.” While the language is vague, the statement allows leaders in Vilnius to claim that they stood fast in defending Lithuania’s national interests and “decided” with their traditional allies how to best proceed.

Moving forward, a mandate for PCA talks will likely be agreed upon at the next foreign ministers meeting in two weeks. Lithuania will not forget about its priorities, and may resist attempts by Germany or others to water down the May 11 agreement. Yet Lithuania can expect an earful at the meeting about the need to find middle ground.

Regardless, the PCA mandate should not be seen solely as a test of Lithuania’s ability to compromise, but also a test for how seriously EU heavyweights treat the concerns of their junior partners. Dialogue with Russia is clearly important, but perceptions also matter; it is vital not to send the message that the Union will ignore its members’ legitimate concerns when treating with Moscow. And Georgia should not in any way be sacrificed on the altar of EU-Russia relations; the Baltic States will be watching.

Ryan R. Miller is a Research Analyst at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.