Missile Defense and U.S.-Polish Relations
Central Europe Digest
Posted: 15 May 2007
The success of the forthcoming U.S. missile defense negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic depends on the willingness of the United States to broaden the dialogue beyond the requirement for status of forces and technical agreements. These negotiations offer an opportunity to further define and strengthen the respective bilateral partnerships. Disinclination to place them in a broader context could jeopardize Washington’s ambitions to deploy a third missile site in Central Europe.
Defining mutual security interests lies at the heart of this issue. Polish and U.S. defense leaders recently reiterated that the proposed stationing of ground-based defense interceptors will not only enhance Poland’s security, but that of Western Europe as well. Both agree on the importance of this goal; however, Warsaw interprets “security requirements” differently from Washington. For the United States, the deployment of interceptors in Poland (and tracking radar in the Czech Republic) contributes to the enhancement of defensive capabilities against a growing threat from Iran. This same deployment underscores Polish concerns about increasing risks, rising security needs and perceived defense and security weaknesses.
The missile defense negotiations could serve as a vehicle to define the “strategic partnership” that interlocutors in both countries frequently use to describe their relations with one another. How the terms “strategic,” “partnership,” and “strategic partnership” are understood will define the bilateral relationships for the coming generation. Hopefully this opportunity will not be misspent in the quid pro quo of negotiations.
In defining their strategic partnership, Poles and Americans may want to re-energize a mutual defense transformation initiative. In 2002, the Polish Ministry of National Defense joined the U.S. Department of Defense in a joint Defense Transformation Initiative to cooperate on shaping the capabilities of the armed forces through unit training, partnership activities, force development and missile defense. Though deemphasized as a consequence of U.S. operations in Iraq, this initiative offers a valuable framework to address Polish concerns of increasing risk, rising security needs, and means for overcoming perceived military weaknesses.
A re-energized Defense Transformation Initiative could be expanded to include officer exchanges, as well as focused Research and Development and defense armament agreements, comparable to those which the United States enjoys with numerous other partners. Furthermore, this initiative can serve to further define specific efforts to grow a strategic partnership based on mutual knowledge and respect, rather than solely on the deployment of strategic assets.
The importance of Poland’s successful military transformation for the United States was underscored in the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review document, “Building Partnership Capability Execution Roadmap.” The roadmap seeks to enhance the capabilities of, and cooperation with, international partners by improving security cooperation effectiveness. The method for doing so will require a combination of intellectual, military and financial support. Successful transformation matters for Poland, as well as for the United States. A strong, robust, well-trained and interoperable Polish military strengthens both NATO and European Union capabilities. An employable Polish military possessing common and interoperable capabilities like those enjoyed by U.S. forces, and at readiness levels to rapidly react to various regional or global crises and threats, advances the U.S. interest of restoring and strengthening international security. Poland has demonstrated its capabilities and proficiency in deployments in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Successful transformation still requires political will to sustain Washington’s efforts.
The Poles, too, need to approach this partnership with a clear vision, established priorities, and allocated resources. A recently-completed Strategic Defense Review (SDR) offers an outline of such a vision and priorities and alludes to possible resource needs for either comprehensively transforming or selectively modernizing Polish forces. Poland should publish a White Book on Polish Defense signed by President Kaczynski, who in his capacity as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces will signal the acceptance of SDR recommendations. Such a document would unambiguously define the military that Poland needs. As an open document, it will force change on this inherently (and appropriately) conservative institution. The Polish government must also encourage public discussion of defense and security matters, and begin to think in state categories, rather than partisan political terms.
On the eve of missile defense negotiations, former Defense Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said the United States needs to once again see the world through the eyes of its allies and offer them a partnership that enhances the security of both. The U.S. Administration needs to remember that the purpose of security cooperation is to broaden, deepen, institutionalize and make more enduring and resilient an increasingly important transatlantic security relationship – one that promises to become more influential in both NATO and the EU. Missile defense should not be addressed as the end result of this relationship but as a supporting pillar of a strategic alliance.
By themselves, the proposed U.S. missile defense sites offer little of strategic value from the perspective of the Central European countries involved. Two small facilities staffed by a handful of contractors are not the equivalent of establishing a more traditional military based featuring permanently-deployed servicemen and their families. The latter offers far greater value in terms of establishing military cooperation and social relationships of enduring value. Hence, there is a need to embed missile defense cooperation in a broader and more comprehensive strategic framework.
The success of the missile defense negotiations depends on Washington’s willingness to engage the Poles in a dialogue that encompasses topics beyond just the interceptor site. The strategic interests and needs of both Poland and the United States must be part of these discussions, so that a broader framework for mutual security can be established.
Peter Podbielski is a retired Colonel, U.S. Army, with extensive Foreign Area Officer expertise gained through numerous Central European postings and Washington DC assignments.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.