Principled Pragmatism: Germany and NATO Expansion

Posted: 15 July 2008

by Patrick Keller

Early April in Bucharest: The foreign policy spokesman of Germany's conservative CDU/CSU, Eckart von Klaeden, is almost booed off the stage while explaining a policy position of his chancellor. Meanwhile, Chancellor Angela Merkel herself, in the words of Germany's major daily, "gets hassled by a band of foreign statesmen" who try to pressure her into changing her mind. Just a few short months ago, at the G-8 summit, Mrs. Merkel's leadership was universally cheered, earning her the nickname of "Miss World." What happened?

Ever since 2005, when U.S. President Bush strongly advocated a NATO accession of Georgia and Ukraine, the issue has been dividing the allies – mostly along geographic lines. The United States and the Central and Eastern European members of NATO generally support the desire of the former Soviet republics, while most Western European states are skeptical about the timing and the political implications of this further round of NATO enlargement. As it turned out, Germany – alongside France – became the leading voice of those who wanted the process to stall.

At first glance, this is a surprising break with Germany's traditional post-Cold War NATO policy. After all, it was Volker Rühe – a member of Merkel's party and then-Secretary of Defense – who was the first Western European official pushing for NATO enlargement in the mid-1990s. The arguments that led to the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were the same as those of today's supporters of enlargement: NATO is the institution ensuring a Europe whole and free; as such, its door to democratic European aspirants should always be open. The countries in Europe's east have legitimate security interests, leading them to seek the protection of NATO. At the same time, all the other members – especially those bordering on non-member states – have an interest in avoiding a power vacuum in what used to be the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. Thus, NATO is not only a military alliance, but also an instrument of political stabilization. It can and should provide incentives to the aspiring members to reform their political systems and commit themselves to Western values. In turn, a failure to offer membership to states such as Ukraine and Georgia could undermine – or even terminate – their efforts to do just that.

The reasons against these most recent plans for NATO enlargement also carry more than an echo from the 1990s: NATO extending east will provoke Russia, rekindling its historic fears of encirclement. A good relationship with Russia is – to most Western Europeans, at least – more important than to assuage the (probably exaggerated) fears of the Eastern European states. Also, there is skepticism about the maturity of the candidates – are their political systems stable enough to warrant membership? Plus, in the brutal final calculation that is the essence of international relations, is their survival as independent nations worth a war that might be most costly to the current members?

Until now, the German governments have always gone with the first line of argument, supporting enlargement for moral as well as strategic reasons. To understand the change in German attitude one has to understand the change in circumstance. There are three main differences that alter the German position in comparison to the debate in the 1990s.

First, we have a different Russia. Today's Russia is not the ailing state of yesterday, but an increasingly authoritarian power backed by rich natural resources that is reclaiming a spot among the global players. Given Germany's dependence on foreign energy and given Russia's considerable leverage in many global conflicts, it seems prudent to establish and maintain a close relationship with Russia. Thus, the alliance should be considerate of Russia's interests and fears. This view is particularly common among the Social Democrats, the junior partner in Angela Merkel's coalition, represented by foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Russia's aggressive policies towards its neighbors should be tolerated or that Russia should have a veto over NATO decisions.

Second, Germany is in a different geostrategic position. One of the driving motivations behind Mr. Rühe's push for enlargement was his desire to protect Germany's eastern border. With that accomplished, Germany is surrounded by friends and allies. That changes the strategic calculus for further enlargement, removing much of the urgency. Such an argument might not seem noble, but it is the reality of international security policy.

Third, NATO's role has changed. This is the key to the shift in the enlargement debate. It is not so much about the lack of public support in Ukraine or the riddle of Georgia's unsolved territorial conflicts but rather about NATO's identity. In the 1990s, NATO was all about political stabilization through alleviation of anti-Russian fears and economic and societal reform. Today, NATO is much more focused on its missions – in Afghanistan for instance. The raison d'être has shifted; NATO has turned from an alliance in being into an alliance in doing. Therefore, what contributions the prospective members can bring to the success of these missions has become incomparably more relevant. And there are serious doubts about the net benefit of these candidates – despite Ukraine's laudable support of nearly all NATO missions.

The combination of these three factors was enough to change the general attitude of ten member countries, led by Germany and France. But as the NATO summit itself has demonstrated, they were not sufficient to prevent an outcome that is acceptable to all parties. The skeptics delayed the Membership Action Plan for Ukraine and Georgia, and they have implemented a rather open timeframe for future accession. On the other hand, the allies have agreed that both countries will become members of NATO. Such unequivocal clarity has never before been used in a NATO statement regarding enlargement. In addition, the language is sharp and clear when it comes to Russia's role: It is welcome as a friend and partner, but it will not divide the allies or – even indirectly – veto their decisions. This result is the kind of principled pragmatism Angela Merkel has advocated and that strengthens the unity, efficiency, and vision of the Atlantic alliance.

Dr. Patrick Keller is the Coordinator of Foreign & Security Policy at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Berlin, Germany. His two most recent books analyze neoconservatism's role in American foreign policy and Bill Clinton's approach to international relations.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.