Pseudo-Democracy at the Gates?
Central Europe Digest
In the wake of the December 2nd Russian parliamentary elections, the prospects for liberal democracy are as bleak in that country as at any time since the fall of the Berlin Wall. For the nearby countries of Central Europe, the reemergence of an authoritarian and increasingly assertive Russia conjures up painful memories of Soviet dominance. Yet the greatest danger of Russia’s democratic backsliding may be the bad example it sets for other post-communist states. If precautions are not taken, Russia’s relapse could create a domino effect of eroding democratic systems at the periphery of, and even within, Europe itself.
Russian democracy is not being renounced outright; instead it is being rolled back by the Kremlin’s deliberate centralization of power and its carefully crafted cult of personality around President Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin is branding this approach “sovereign democracy,” but it can more appropriately be described as pseudo-democracy. This term generally refers to a system in which democratic processes formally exist but provide no real chance for democratic transfers of power. In practice, pseudo-democratic rulers leverage a dangerous mixture of nationalistic pride and paranoia in order to centralize power in the hands of a single, paternalistic leader – all under the guise of democratic governance.
While pseudo-democracies make no ideological cry for world revolution, the spread of pseudo-democratic “values” is necessary for autocrats to justify their rule with the support of like-minded leaders. For example, Russia’s reciprocal embrace of Belarusian democracy creates a loop of legitimacy for the “sovereign democratic” approach. The more pseudo-democracies that exist, the more legitimacy their governments enjoy in the international arena.
The damage pseudo-democracy is doing to the “brand name” of democracy presents a challenge to Central Europe. Leaders of post-communist countries there and elsewhere should be aware of the risk of contagion from Russia. As scholars of democratic transitions (most notably Laurence Whitehead) have argued, a country’s politics tend to be influenced by that of their neighbors. Under the right circumstances, Russia and Belarus could have a demonstration effect on nearby states. In particular, Russia’s transition to so-called sovereign democracy sets an example of how to remain nominally in the club of democracies while reverting to the trappings of authoritarianism in the name of restoring public order.
Clearly, the threat of pseudo-democracy cropping up in Central Europe should not be exaggerated. The region’s established and maturing post-communist democracies (e.g., Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and even Romania and Bulgaria) face no eminent threat to their hard-won systems of government. At the same time, if pseudo-democracy emerges and/or grows stronger in places like Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucuses or parts of the former Yugoslavia, it may find a surprisingly receptive host in the populations of Central Europe. The recently released 2007 Voice of the People survey, conducted by Gallup International, indicates that just 56 percent of Central and Eastern Europeans responded positively to the statement “In general, I am satisfied with democracy.” A mere 21 percent of citizens in the region believe that their country “is governed by the will of the people.” And while 71 percent of Western Europeans trust their electoral processes, a full 59 percent of those surveyed from Central and Eastern Europe do not.
At a minimum, the combination of pseudo-democracy’s ascension and the increasingly pervasive sense of social disillusionment within former-communist Europe is cause for concern. At a maximum, it presents a freighting, if distant, scenario: a domino effect of illiberal democratic leaders from Moscow and Minsk to Kiev that could protrude into Central Europe. Potential catalysts for the rise of pseudo-democratic tendencies could include economic malaise, inter-ethnic tension or over-zealous anti-corruption campaigns. To ensure that this does not happen, political leaders, academics, activists and concerned citizens should be proactive rather than passive. Two sets of actions, one internal one external, will protect democratic gains in Central Europe and curb the danger of pseudo-democracy at Europe’s doorstep.
Protecting democratic progress within Central Europe:
- Acknowledge the threat of pseudo-democracy. There must be a sober recognition that democratic progress is reversible; this would represent an important first step towards protecting the democratic gains of the last twenty years.
- Highlight the benefits of democracy and be honest about its failures. European leaders must not be shy in emphasizing democracy’s many benefits, but they must also admit that democracy is not a panacea and the transition to democracy is always difficult.
- Treat post-communist democracies as equal partners. The European Union should make sure that it does not treat the populations of Central Europe as second-class citizens; Brussels should recognize these countries’ remarkable progress, while encouraging new member states (Romania and Bulgaria in particular) to vigorously fight corruption.
- Educate the first post-communism generation. The first post-communist generation is about to enter university. Not having experienced communism first-hand, these future leaders could grow weary of democracy and its many promises and discontents.
Encouraging democratic development at Central Europe’s borders:
- Emphasize home-grown democracy. The peoples of Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova should be made to feel confident that embracing liberal democracy does not require the rejection of national tradition or cultural heritage. Indeed, as Edmund Burke argued during an earlier phase of democratization, the only sustainable path for democracy is one in which the foundations of the new political system are grounded in a country’s distinctive national spirit.
- Refute the democracy = chaos myth. Russia’s mismanaged transition is often cited as proof that democracy generates economic and political turmoil. Proponents of democracy should point out that, although the democratic transition is bound to be turbulent, the initial shock is often followed by sustained economic growth.
- Don’t emphasize governance at the expense of democracy. There is a trend in some European aid agencies to disassociate democratic assistance from support for good governance. Good governance is essential, but the dangers of de-linking that goal from democratic progress are obvious in the cases of Russia and China.
- Disentangle democracy promotion from U.S. foreign policy goals. It is important for Europeans to advocate democracy in their own voice. This is especially important for those countries sandwiched between Central Europe and Russia, where one must counter claims that democracy promotion is little more than an American neo-containment policy imbued with latent imperialism.
The victory of democracy over communism does not mean the struggle to ensure freedom on the European continent is over. To the contrary, Central European leaders, activists, and academics must spread the story of their success abroad while consolidating democratic gains at home. Within Central Europe, the past struggle for political freedom must be celebrated as the social challenges of democratic transition are earnestly addressed. Abroad, a powerful message of liberty and economic progress, tempered with realistic expectations, must be offered by Poles, Hungarians, Slovaks, Lithuanians and the many other former Warsaw Pact peoples who have successfully navigated the transition to democracy. With their historical perspective and practical experience, Central Europeans are uniquely positioned to confront the challenge of pseudo-democracy with confidence and decisiveness. Now is the time to do so.
Denis P. Cosgrove is a consultant based in Washington, DC. He is currently pursuing a second master’s degree at Georgetown University.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.