Putin's Peaceniks in Prague?

Posted: 16 June 2008

by Petr Suchý

The war of words over the possible deployment of the radar components of the U.S. missile defense system on Czech soil still draws relatively intense media interest. However, it is not the Czech government which has been the most active on the issue, but rather the opposition. Indeed, Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek and his team gave up on efforts to convince and win over a majority of Czech society even before it began its media campaign. In practice, the government’s campaign had a purely informative and reactive character, which gave the radar’s opponents in the parliamentary opposition, as well as various civil society initiatives, an opening. Whether they realize it or not, these voices are playing into the Kremlin’s hands.

At present, the government remains focused on hammering out the remaining details of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the Americans. Meanwhile, the radar’s detractors are hoping to deliver a final, fatal blow to the project. Moreover, they view their knock-out punch as imminent given the soon-expected vote in the Chamber of Deputies on the U.S.-Czech defense agreement. Opposition parties (the Social Democrats and the Communists) have intensified their anti-radar rhetoric with an eye towards sinking missile defense, as have organizations like Greenpeace and the homegrown Czech initiative Ne základnám (“No to Bases”).

Although almost twenty years have passed since the end of the Cold War, there are unmistakable resemblances between today’s anti-radar voices and the European pacifists who opposed the deployment of U.S. Pershing II missiles in West Germany during the 1980s. Then, as now, members of these opposition groups were unable or unwilling to understand how the military deployment was a necessary reaction to an increasing security threat. Today, we again hear warnings of an arms race, and the rattling of the shallow slogans of peace. Recently, members of Ne základnám organized hunger strikes.

The Czech Social Democrats’ behavior bears a striking resemblance to that of the German Social Democrats under Helmudt Schmidt. When these parties were in power, they tended to support U.S. foreign policy initiatives, regardless of how unpopular this may have been with the public. Everything changed though once they found themselves in opposition, and their priority become gaining the maximum political capital.

Another parallel to the 1980s can be seen in current Russian behavior and attitudes. When former Russian President (and current Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin compared the deployment of radar deployment in the Czech Republic with that of Pershing II in Germany, his comments fell on fertile ground with Czech peaceniks.

Without a doubt, this group’s activities play to Russia’s advantage in its efforts to exploit the polarization of Czech society and block the construction of anti-missile systems in Central Europe. What’s more, it appears that Russia could be subtly working to undermine the radar’s deployment on Czech soil and cause a serious split in the trans-Atlantic alliance.

Russian attention to the Czech Republic during the last two years is more intense than it has been since 1989. When Russian experts give lectures at Czech universities and think-tanks, they often lace their academic presentations with twisted accounts of recent history and sometimes even make outright threats to aim Russian missiles at the radar. Now reports surface that the nation’s secret services suspect increased Russian intelligence activity on Czech territory.

The recent discovery that the anti-radar initiative is supported in its propaganda by the advertising agency BigBoard, which is also active in Moscow and Minsk, thus comes as no surprise. This agency’s massive support is fundamental for an NGO initiative with a supposedly modest budget. The conclusion some secret service professionals have reached, that the Russian secret services are behind this support, seems highly likely. If Mr. Putin practiced this tactic in the past, why should his former colleagues, under his leadership, not continue to do the same?

Despite all these circumstances, the final result of the vote on missile defense cooperation with the United States, which has fundamental importance beyond the radar itself, will depend on the Czech government and parliament.

But it is important that any vote not send a signal that allows Moscow to claim victory. If Russia believes that its demands have a significant influence on the actions and decisions of countries formerly within its sphere of influence, Moscow’s assertiveness will only increase. So if Russia can succeed in deep-sixing the Czech radar deployment, this could affect intra-alliance relations in a fundamental way.

It is worth remembering that Russia’s negative attitude towards missile defense in Central Europe is not primarily a result of legitimate security concerns, but rather intentions of a Machiavellian geopolitical nature. Such Russian pressure must be resisted and actively opposed.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.