A Poland that Can Accept America's 'No'

Posted: 14 December 2007  

by Olaf Osica

In his November 30th article in Central Europe Digest, “An America that Can Say No,” Doug Bandow encourages U.S. negotiators to be tough on Poland and even say “no” if their Polish partners demand compensation for placing ten U.S. interceptors in our country. He is wrong because this advice is counterproductive.

Like many American foreign policy experts, Bandow mistakenly believes that the United States can effectively depart from its role as a “European power,” while continuing to draw political profits from its past. Today’s Europe is far more complicated and less prone to American influence than many in Washington realize or want to believe. This new situation, which is predominantly a consequence of 9/11 and EU enlargement, means that Poland operates in a slightly different strategic context, to put it mildly, than does the United States. Polish stakeholders are therefore right in considering the strategic implications of missile defense not only through the prism of the U.S. threat perception, but first and foremost through the lens of Polish interests.

It does not make any sense to weigh and compare who – Warsaw or Washington – has been a better ally, and whose turn it is now to requite. And this is not simply because comparing a poor-but-proud medium-sized European country with the “indispensable nation,” which is “taller and therefore sees further,” – as Madeleine Albright used to emphasize - would be pointless.  There was a time when the United States was eager to create a “Europe whole and free.” There was also a time when Washington appeared determined to destroy much of its own work by contrasting “old” and “new” Europe. There was a time, too, when Poland was desperately in search of a protector without having any “hard currency” to offer in exchange (being a total free-rider). And yet Poland took a brave and risky decision to stand by America in Iraq.

Poland stayed in Iraq for five years, not because it had any illusions about its military role or political profits (“French fries” have long since reappeared on American menus), but because it bore a moral obligation to help Iraqis and to remain a reliable partner of the United States. The planned Polish pull-out from Iraq is hence clearly a Polish failure. But it results from a sad conclusion that the United States has lost its strategic direction and no longer even bothers to try to convince its partners that they should stay.

“Once bitten, twice shy.” The U.S. request for Poland to host ten interceptors is widely seen as a request to go to Iraq once more. Warsaw may take a risk again, but it rightly insists on its own security agenda – an agenda that has little to do with Iran or America’s global war on terror. Hence, missile defense appears interesting only as a vehicle for advancing Poland’s interests in Europe and committing the United States to regional security. Does it involve extra money? Yes it does, because political projects void of funding are nothing more than rhetorical actions or cheap-talk. Does it involve weapons? Yes it does, because it is not in American interests to place missile defense facilities in a defenseless ally, especially since Washington’s clumsiness in promoting the “shield” has already given Russia an opportunity for committing military blackmail in the region. To put it another way: can we, as allies, accept a situation where missile defense sites in Poland strengthen U.S. defense at the expense of Polish security concerns?

If the United States takes Bandow’s advice it will only be a matter of time before the question asked in Poland is no longer “What will we gain by consenting to the U.S. request?” but rather, “What will we actually lose by saying no?” If the benefit to Poland from agreeing to U.S. plans is protection against Iranian ballistic missiles, thickly coated with rhetoric of “partnership,” then Poles can easily live with America’s “no,” – and without its missile defense.

Dr. Olaf Osica is a research fellow at the Natolin European Centre in Warsaw.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.