Romania's Black Sea Offensive

Posted: 15 September 2008

by George Visan

At first glance, Romania’s reaction to the war between Georgia and Russia could be interpreted as muted, given the very vocal and proactive responses from countries in Central Europe’s Baltic tier. The leaders of Poland and the three Baltic States condemned Russian actions from the outset and flew out to Tbilisi during the first few days of the conflict to express solidarity with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Certainly, Bucharest did not react with the same vigor. But it would be wrong to conclude that Romania was upstaged by the Baltic quartet in its own backyard – Bucharest just chose a different avenue to respond to the crisis. Romania’s policy response took the form of a diplomatic offensive aimed at taking the pulse of the Black Sea region and signaling to Moscow that the “August War” ran counter to Romanian interests.

Romania’s diplomatic offensive took the form of a two-day (August 20-21) whistle stop tour by President Traian Basescu to Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey. His trip included meetings with the leaders of these countries, and gave a clear message to the Kremlin that Romania will not accept territorial revisions of Georgia. Ever since President Basescu came to power and Romania started playing an active role in the Black Sea, Bucharest had warned about the possibility that so-called “frozen conflicts” could heat up rapidly under the right circumstances. So in this sense the Russian-Georgian war was something the Romanian foreign policy elite expected. True, there was not much of a public outcry from the Romanian authorities, but this had more to do with policy planning than being caught flat-footed.

Basescu wisely called on both warring parties to “act prudently and cautiously.” In his view, the Helsinki Final Act should serve as the basis for the peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two countries. Furthermore, Basescu emphasized during his meeting with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili that Romania considers “Georgia’s territorial integrity a priority” and will continue to support Georgia’s and Ukraine’s bid to join NATO. As for the future of the two energy projects in which Romania is involved – the Nabucco gas pipeline and the Pan European Oil Pipeline (PEOP) linking Constanta with Trieste – Basescu declared that these are still “viable projects” despite the recent war in the region. 

Romania quickly positioned itself as one of Georgia’s supporters, however other than refusing to include Russia as a stop on Basescu’s tour of the region, it was careful not to upset Moscow. Romania has already irritated Kremlin elites by joining NATO, hosting U.S. military facilities, supporting Ukraine and Georgia's NATO membership bids, promoting Moldova as a possible future EU member, and by trying to elevate the issue of frozen conflicts on the Western agenda. However, now that Russia has resorted to military force to deal with a smaller neighbor, Romania, at least in the short run, will be careful in terms of what it says to Moscow.

Yet Romania did use the opportunity to promote its vision for the future of the Black Sea region – and one that does not exactly dovetail with the Russian vision. Anticipating President Basescu’s tour in the Black Sea, Foreign Affairs Minister Lazăr Comănescu participated on August 19 at the North Atlantic Council special ministerial session where he stated that “the events in Georgia have also showed that regional actors cannot prevent or resolve such developments by themselves. That is why, the international community, in particular the EU, NATO and the OSCE, should get more involved in ensuring peace and maintaining stability in the region.” When visiting Ukraine, Basescu called on the European Union to deal with frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus using the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy peacekeeping mechanisms. By calling on the European Union, NATO and the OSCE to increase their involvement in Black Sea security issues, Romania clearly showed that it considers the status quo inadequate.

In Moldova, home to another of Europe’s “frozen conflicts” – Transnistria, Basescu pointed to the precedent set by Kosovo independence (something Romania disagreed with), almost to the point of saying “I told you so.” Speaking in Chisinau on August 20, Basescu declared, “At present, sovereign and independent countries are dismantled in the name of collective rights of the minorities… This is what happened with Kosovo and Serbia lost a part of its territory, and the things foreshadow a similar direction in South Ossetia and, should I dare say it, in Abkhazia.” Basescu stressed that “no sort of minority rights claimed over a certain territory can prevail over the territorial integrity, sovereignty and the borders of an independent state.”

Romania’s borders, it should not be forgotten, are not far from the Transnistrian conflict, and Bucharest does not want to see that Moldovan morass flare up again. Some in Romania now fear that Russia will use the prospect of Transnistrian independence as a bargaining chip with Chisinau in order to transform Moldova into a Russian client state. The last thing Bucharest wants is Russian client state on its borders coupled with a Russian military presence.

It is probably too early to say if Romania’s diplomatic efforts in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian war have made much of a difference. Besides, many events have unfolded since August 21. Only a few days after Basescu’s trip, the Russians announced they would recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, vindicating Romania’s focus on the volatility of frozen conflicts and providing the West even more of a wakeup call about Russian intentions. As for the two major energy projects, Nabucco and PEOP, Romania may be too optimistic given the complexity of the new security situation in the region. It is unlikely that any major investments in the energy sector will be made in the near future so long as the situation in Georgia remains uncertain. Nevertheless, Romania’s efforts are relevant because they show its willingness to oppose Russian energy influence in the region. After all, someone has to.

George Visan is a junior analyst at Global Video Media in Bucharest, Romania.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.