Romanian Reformers Isolated

Posted: 01 July 2008

by Serban Popescu

The June local and municipal elections confirmed the Democratic Liberal Party (PDL) as the most important Romanian center-right formation. Furthermore, the electoral results reaffirmed President Traian Basescu as the country’s most astute politician, able to turn a minor party into a reform-minded force to be reckoned with over the course of several years. Why then are the Democratic Liberals not in the mood to celebrate?

Mostly because the Social Democrats (PSD), the largest left-wing party, won the most mayoral offices nationwide. Although PDL, a party created by the union of Basescu’s Democratic Party (PD) and a seditious group of Liberals (previously known as PLD), scored highest in party presence in county councils, PSD was not far behind. The National Liberal Party (PNL) of Prime Minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu took third place. Five years ago, when the Democrats and the Liberals joined forces in “The Justice and Truth Alliance,” such results would have signaled a clear victory for the political right and boded well for stability ahead of the November 2008 parliamentary elections. But this is not so today.

Instead, PDL looks politically isolated and unable to garner support for a minority government in the fall. The odds of reaching a new agreement with their former PNL allies are close to naught. Tensions began to appear in 2005 after PNL refused to pave the way for early elections, at a time when PSD was at its weakest. When PD attempted to support the PNL wing favorable to a union between the two coalition partners, Tăriceanu excluded the rebels from the Liberals’ ranks. The latter were to unite with PD to form PDL. Basescu’s inflexible political style only fueled the turmoil by radicalizing moderate Liberal members.

A major symbolic loss for PDL took place in Romania’s capital. On June 15, the former Social Democrat Sorin Oprescu won the runoff for the mayor’s office in Bucharest, defeating the PDL contender, Vasile Blaga. As a result, the Romanian Right lost control of the capital for the first time since the 1989 Revolution. In spite of Basescu’s open support, Blaga proved unable to inject verve into a timid and sterile campaign. Bowing to peer pressure and heeding the party’s call to accept the nomination, Blaga astounded even his diehard supporters by his lack of enthusiasm. Oprescu, on the other hand, simply looked more determined to win the race. He chose to leave PSD when Cristian Diaconescu, a young politician lionized by the media as the party's best chance to reform, was nominated to run for the mayor’s office in Bucharest. From then on, Oprescu would assiduously present himself as the genuine independent, while portraying Blaga in distasteful television ads as one of President Basescu’s many minions.

Blaga’s failure suggests that the President’s support no longer automatically translates into electoral success and that the reformist message, extremely effective in 2004, has lost its attraction. His defeat leaves the Democratic Old Guard weakened, at a time when other party heavyweights failed to renew their public mandate, and will most likely embolden the excluded Liberals to alter the power balance in the PDL. On the Left, Oprescu’s victory is set to further erode the position of PSD leader, Mircea Geoană, and confirm the strength of the party wing coalesced around former President Ion Iliescu.

The projections for the fall elections to Parliament are complicated by the uncharted electoral landscape. Importantly, these are the first elections to take place according to the mixed-member proportional voting system. The most likely political configuration in the parliament will include PSD, PDL, PNL and the Hungarian Democratic Union (in that order). Since the latter are expected to side with whoever emerges as the strongest, a PSD-PNL alliance or a PNL agreement to support a PSD minority government would effectively leave Basescu’s party out in the cold. Second, the November elections will take place one year before the Presidential elections. This could frustrate the aspirations of PDL politicians, who would no longer be able to ride Basescu’s coattails the way they did in 2004.

PDL will have to mull over how to handle the loss of Bucharest and why they failed to mobilize voters on the anti-corruption platform that worked in the past. For now, the soul-searching has produced less-than-stellar results. The party moved to take control of the General Council of Bucharest by proposing an alliance with the unseemly New Generation Party (PNG) – a small party led by George “Gigi” Becali, the owner of the Steaua Bucharest soccer club. Becali sports an inconsistent tax record, a candid appreciation for the Iron Guard (Romanian fascists actively involved in the WWII pogroms), and a limo that he insists on driving himself. Clearly, PDL needs new ideas.

Serban Popescu is a Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy at Central European University in Budapest, Hungary, and an Associate Scholar at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.