The Missile Defense Distraction

Posted: 01 July 2008

by Peter I. Belk

The continued American push for a missile defense system complicates U.S.-European relations and alienates the Russian Federation. It is a dangerous distraction away from the real challenge – Iran – which requires careful and considered cooperation from all parties.

Polish demands for a costly military modernization package could have provided Washington with a face-saving opportunity to re-think the push for the European-based portion of its missile defense network (the so-called “third site”). Instead, on June 19, U.S. officials indicated that America would consider the placement of missile interceptors on Lithuanian territory, should the Polish option fall through. Needless to say, this did nothing to ease the Russian fear – real or imagined – that a U.S.-European global missile defense system is designed with a Russian threat in mind.

Given Polish resistance, overall European ambivalence and opposition from Moscow, it is clear that barring some unforeseen development, the Bush Administration will not be able to move forward with the “third site” during the balance of its tenure in office. Nevertheless, the Administration pushes on.

The key rationale given by the United States for the European component of the shield is that it is necessary to counter the imminent threat posed by Iran. Without question, Iran’s continued intransigence with respect to its nuclear program, as well as Tehran’s continued push to develop a ballistic missile capability with potentially intercontinental range, poses a threat to the United States (and to Europe as well). 

However, making missile defense a centerpiece of U.S. policy on Iran seems to have certain built-in assumptions, all of which are problematic. These assumptions are important to understand in the context of the missile defense debate and its impact on the effectiveness of a multilateral policy vis-à-vis Iran.

To begin with, the emphasis on bringing on-line a missile defense system in Europe to counter the Iranian nuclear threat assumes that the Iranian nuclear program’s current trajectory will in fact ultimately lead to a nuclear weapons capability quickly (by 2011, the soonest European based interceptors would go on-line). But this remains an open question. Even if one takes into account the most optimistic forecasts by the Iranians themselves, based on the available information (in particular, from the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate), progress towards achieving a complete nuclear fuel cycle to achieve this weapons capability in this short period of time still seems remote. 

There is also the issue of the effectiveness of the missile shield itself. The entire system is predicated on an assumed likelihood of success in defending against a missile strike launched from Iran. While recent tests have shown some progress in system effectiveness, it is far from clear that the immediate positioning of a number of interceptors on European territory would yield the requisite defensive umbrella necessary to achieve the blanket protections to thwart an Iranian missile threat.  

Further, there is an implicit assumption that Iran is destined to acquire a nuclear device. The above propositions take it as a given that Iran will be a nuclear power with the ballistic missile technology to deliver nuclear payloads at long-range. While planning for worst-case scenarios is important, this seems to admit a premature failure of current counter-proliferation policy.

When coupling the above considerations with the significant tensions that missile defense causes between the Russians and NATO, one must question whether this is the most effective way to deal with the threat from Iran. Having said that, what then is the best policy option? Or is global missile defense the least bad alternative?

The way forward would seem to suggest that at this juncture, America should step back and recalibrate which diplomatic pressure points it wishes to leverage in getting its UN partners to tackle Iran’s nuclear program. While the United States has made some strides with Europe in this regard, Russia remains a key interlocutor on Iran with whom much spade work is still required.

With that in mind, the United States should be prepared to walk back – for now – from the third site, but only inasmuch as U.S. diplomats can achieve greater solidarity with their Russian counterparts on the issue of Iran. There would have to be a recognition of Russia’s legitimate security concerns and fears of NATO encroachment, while at the same time forcing Moscow to confront the stark possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran (of which Russia bears a certain responsibility). A shift on missile defense would put the onus on the Russians to get serious about the dangers posed by the Islamic Republic.

By taking the high ground on missile defense, the United States can further expose the weakness of the Russian argument on Iran, while at the same time striving for a more cooperative posture with Moscow. At the end of the day, this can give something that the United States, Europe and Russia can all agree upon: the need to collaboratively focus on today’s #1 counter-proliferation challenge in the absence of a distracting debate about missile defense.

Peter I. Belk, an attorney specializing in international transactions, is an expert on Eurasian and Middle Eastern affairs. Prior to entering private practice, Mr. Belk served in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the U.S. Department of State, including assignments in the Office of Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs and a detail to UNSCOM in 1998.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Center for European Policy Analysis.