Mending Fences: Repairing U.S.-Central European Relations After Iraq
Posted: 26 Oct 2006
Executive Summary
When the United States invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003, it received the almost reflexive support of all ten former communist countries in Central Europe. Despite intense pressure from powerful Western European neighbors and stiff opposition at home, Central European capitals displayed unflinching solidarity with the United States at every stage of the war and its aftermath. In exchange for this support, most Central Europeans expected to enjoy a closer relationship with Washington and increased U.S. sympathy for regional goals and interests after the war. However, despite remaining in Iraq through the fiercest phase of the postwar insurgency, many Central Europeans feel they have failed to receive significant benefits from Washington. Across the region, there is growing frustration with what is widely seen as America’s unwillingness to reward its regional partners for their loyalty in the conflict. Unless the United States takes steps to reverse this perception, it risks losing Central European support in future crises – support that may be a critical factor in ensuring the success of U.S. policies in Europe and beyond. U.S. policymakers must move swiftly to shore up America’s relations with these new and important allies, reaffirm Washington’s long-term commitment to the region, and demonstrate that it still pays to be friends of the world’s sole remaining superpower.
Introduction
The German statesman Otto von Bismarck once remarked that states should “beware of sentimental alliances in which good feelings are the only compensation for noble sacrifices.” To the leaders of present-day Central Europe, Bismarck’s warning might seem a wise principle upon which to base their future dealings with the United States. Three years after casting in their lot with Washington in its mission to invade and remake the nation of Iraq, the countries of what U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called the “New Europe” feel they have little to show for their political, financial, and military contributions to the war effort. Despite millions of dollars in public expenditure and dozens of war dead, Central European capitals so far have been unable to translate their support for overseas U.S. military campaigns into significant political and economic concessions from Washington. Contrary to expectations, Central European companies did not receive major contracts to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq, nor did regional militaries – pushed to their logistical and budgetary limits by deployment 2,000 miles from home – obtain the sought-after increase in U.S. funds for force modernization. Most importantly, despite the concerted efforts of Central European diplomats, lobbyists, and even heads of state, the region’s capitals still have not convinced Washington to grant their citizens an exemption from rigid U.S. visa requirements.
To a growing number of officials in the region, Washington’s apparent unwillingness to reward its allies in these and other areas is seen as evidence that the United States is interested less in forming lasting partnerships with the region’s powers than in using them as cheap, dependable allies in moments of crisis – as friends on America’s terms, when it suits America’s interests. As a result, many Central Europeans have begun to question the sincerity and durability of U.S. engagement in their region, as well as the wisdom of supporting the United States in future crises. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, there is talk in Central Europe of re-appraising – and possibly downgrading – the relationship with America.[1]
For U.S. policymakers, news of this growing frustration may come as a surprise. In recent months, Washington has made repeated efforts – multiple high-level visits, increased military aid, legislation on visas – to communicate its appreciation for regional support in the Iraq War. And while U.S. officials are aware of the strains that the war placed on America’s relationships with those Western European countries that opposed the war, relations with Central Europe – where all ten countries contributed troops to the coalition – are thought to be at an all-time high. But they are not. To an extent not fully realized in Washington, U.S.-Central European relations – though not on the verge of rupture – have been weakened by the perception of postwar American ingratitude. Failure to repair this damage could undermine Central European support for future U.S. policy and have significant negative implications for American interests – not only in the region itself, but in Europe and the wider international arena. A window of opportunity exists for the United States to “mend fences” with its Central European allies, but doing so will require greater skill in managing alliances – both in the region and generally – and a clearer definition of America’s long-term goals and interests in Central Europe.
Losing the New Europe?[2]
When the United States went to war in the spring of 2003, Central European capitals opened their treasuries and arsenals, placing at Washington’s disposal an array of soldiers, weapons, bases, and equipment. Poland – America’s chief partner in the region and the third largest overall contributor to the coalition – sent a 2,600-strong army brigade. Slovakia and the Czech Republic sent chemical warfare and anti-missile units. Hungary provided logistical troops, training for Iraqi police, and a mélange of equipment for the remodeled Iraqi Army – including 77 tanks, 36 armored personnel carriers, 100 cargo trucks, and millions of rounds of ammunition.[3] Slovenia – a country the size of Vermont – sent enough rifles to equip two Iraqi divisions. Cash-strapped Romania and Bulgaria provided infantry, engineers, military instructors, and access to strategically-located bases on the Black Sea. Even the tiny Baltic States pitched in: Lithuania sent mechanized infantry, Latvia sent sappers and medics, and Estonia – the least populous country in Central Europe – sent what has turned out to be the finest light infantry unit in the coalition, along with its entire inventory of assault rifles to outfit the under-equipped Iraqi Army.
Altogether, the Central European contribution to the mission in Iraq has amounted to about 5,000 troops (a third of all non-U.S. forces), at least half a billion dollars, and perhaps the largest combined donation of equipment to the Iraqi Army of any non-U.S. coalition members.[4] For the small and traditionally-insulated powers of Central Europe, this surely represents the greatest mustering of resources for an adventure further from home than any ever undertaken in the region’s history. And while small in comparison to U.S. outlays for the war, the costs incurred were considerable for a group of countries that are among the poorest in the European Union (EU). Indeed, in proportion to population and GDP, Central Europeans are some of the largest overall contributors to the coalition.
Sour Grapes
Central Europe’s generous support of U.S. war aims is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that none of these countries have any discernable interests at stake in Iraq or its environs. For the most part, their willingness to backstop U.S. policy in the war stemmed from a widespread, genuine faith in American ideals and the legitimacy and efficacy of U.S. power.[5] As Central European officials are quick to point out, it was a sense of shared values – not cold-hard calculations of national self-interest – that ultimately led Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and their neighbors to follow America to war in a distant land.[6] Nevertheless, most regional leaders expected to see some tangible expressions of American gratitude after the war.[7] In the short term, they hoped to gain U.S. support on three major agenda items: access to postwar reconstruction contracts, increased assistance for military modernization, and visa-free travel to the United States. In addition, Central Europe’s largest power – Poland – assumed that its particularly prominent role in the coalition would improve Warsaw’s standing in Washington as a major regional ally. In all four areas, regional officials say their hopes have been disappointed.
Iraqi Reconstruction. The first hint that postwar benefits might be slow to materialize came when the U.S. government began divvying up contracts for the postwar reconstruction of Iraq. These lucrative contracts – some of which exceeded $5 billion – were seen in Central Europe as a potential windfall of capital that would create jobs and provide a boost to local economies.[8] In Hungary, the Foreign Ministry told the country’s businesses to expect $35-40 million in contracts as soon as hostilities died down.[9] In Bulgaria, the government received an avalanche of applications – 150 in all – from companies of all sizes. And in Poland, many people assumed that – in light of the prominent role played by Polish companies in the prewar Iraqi economy (where Poles had a hand in everything from Iraqi freeways and irrigation canals to the Baghdad electrical grid) – they would be top candidates in the postwar bidding process.
However, when contracts were awarded, Central European firms received almost nothing. Polish arms firm Bumar lost a $425-million bid to supply the Iraqi army – which went instead to a U.S. company.[10] Only after a concerted lobbying effort that included a personal request from Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski did Poland manage to win a handful of bids. Other regional powers were left more or less empty-handed – a pill made doubly bitter by Washington’s insistence that they forgive hundreds of millions of dollars in unpaid prewar Iraqi debt.[11] In almost every case, the amount of debt in question – $564 million for Poland, $230 million for Hungary, $147 million for Czech Republic – far exceeded the amount gained in contracts. For many Central Europeans, this inability to break even in the war – much less profit from it – seemed to confirm the lesson learned in the Gulf War and Kosovo that (as one Hungarian observer put it), when accompanying the United States to war, only big countries get a share of the spoils, while smaller powers have “practically no chance at all.”[12]
Military Modernization. A second bone of contention for Central Europeans in the post-Iraq period has been Washington’s reluctance to ramp up aid to regional militaries. Struggling under the dual strain of flagging budgets and ambitious reform programs, Central European military establishments were stretched thin by their unexpected deployment to, and sustained presence in, Iraq. In Hungary, where the military was already reeling from a 13 percent budget cut, the costs of deploying even a small force to Iraq presented a significant burden that drained scarce resources from other priorities, including modernization.[13] Similarly, in Poland, the war came on the cusp of an ambitious transformation process and imposed costs (about $100 million a year) roughly equal to the country’s entire annual budget for procurement and investment.[14] As Polish Defense Minister Radek Sikorski has pointed out, this confronted Poland with the uncomfortable choice of either continuing to reform and modernize its forces (a goal long promoted by U.S. officials) or maintain a significant presence in Iraq – but not both. Having chosen the latter option at Washington’s behest, many Poles assumed that U.S. policymakers would pick up the tab on modernization – especially since America would be a major beneficiary of any improvements in Polish military capabilities. As an official from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it, “The question is whether the United States, when thinking about the future, is willing to support an increase in the abilities of the Polish military to make them capable of supporting U.S. troops in future conflicts.”[15]
The American answer to that question, Polish officials say, has been a resounding “No.” Though Washington boosted assistance to Poland twice since the end of war – in 2004 and 2005 – Polish defense officials point out that these increases came only after repeated high-level requests and were nowhere near the sums needed to plug the budgetary gap created by Iraq.[16] Here, as with reconstruction contracts, Poles and their neighbors feel that the costs of assisting the United States in the war have outstripped the benefits.
Visas. If Washington’s apparent lack of enthusiasm for increasing military aid is the issue that frustrates political elites in Central Europe, the one that matters most to the average Pole, Czech or Hungarian is visas. Unlike their Western European neighbors, Central Europeans still have to obtain a visa when traveling to the United States – a lengthy process that entails an application, interview at the U.S. Embassy, and non-refundable $100 fee (the equivalent of a week’s income in parts of the region). In light of their contributions in Iraq, many Central Europeans hoped that Washington would be willing to lift these restrictions and include its regional allies in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program.
In the period since the start of the war, leaders from almost every country in the region have asked President Bush to do just that.[17] Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski raised the issue twice – in January 2004 and February 2005 – and even went so far as to provide the White House with a detailed “roadmap” for gradually guiding the issue through Congress. More recently, during President Bush’s state visit to Hungary in August 2006, Hungarian President László Sólyom told U.S. officials that he would not accept an invitation to visit Washington until “the United States cancels the visa duty for Hungarian citizens.”[18]
In the end, despite repeated requests at the highest levels, Central Europeans say that Washington has shown little interest in softening visa requirements – in fact, in the period since the start of the Iraq War, they have actually gotten tighter. As time passes without noticeable movement on the issue, many people in the region feel betrayed. A growing number of Central Europeans wonder why it is that the French and Germans, who opposed the war, are able to travel to America without a visa, while Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians – who are serving with U.S. troops in Iraq – are not. The apparent unwillingness of U.S. policymakers to answer this question has done more to fuel discontent among the Central European public – and probably more to contaminate the overall relationship – than any other issue that has emerged since the war.
Strategic Clout. For most Central European capitals, postwar contracts, military aid, and visas were valued as ends in themselves or as ways of offsetting the costs of participation in the war. But for policymakers in Poland, the significance of these concessions lay less in their intrinsic value and more in what Washington’s willingness (or unwillingness) to grant them would say about the country’s importance as a U.S. ally.[19] Given the size of Poland’s contribution in Iraq – and Warsaw’s greater exposure to its political risks – many officials hoped to see their relations with Washington upgraded to the status of a “special relationship” like that in U.S.-UK relations. After all, with U.S.-German relations in shambles after the war, many Poles assumed that America would need a new long-term partner on the European mainland – a role that Poland seemed naturally suited to fill.[20]
In this new role, Poles hoped to gain two important benefits: a stronger hand in Warsaw’s dealings with Moscow and an enhanced position in Europe. However, despite remaining in Iraq (unlike Spain and Italy) through the worst phase of the postwar insurgency, Poland has yet to see a significant ratcheting-up of its profile in Washington. To be sure, there were early signs – e.g., an increase in high-level visits and U.S. support for Polish policy on Ukraine – of closer cooperation. However, these largely rhetorical expressions of solidarity belie what many Polish officials see as a deep-seated American reluctance to take account of Polish interests when formulating U.S. policy. On recent visits to Washington, Polish officials say that, while their U.S. counterparts are eager to discuss American goals, there is a “lack of interest in addressing the Polish agenda.”[21] Instead of a special relationship with Warsaw, Polish leaders sense that Washington has reverted – in the period since the 2005 German elections – to its traditional courtship of Germany as America’s primary continental partner in Europe. “Despite a lot of visits and nice talk about partnership,” one Polish observer told the author, “when it comes to real politics, the view in Central Europe is that Washington wants to make Germany the key regional player, and once again sees Poland as a backwater like it did in the past.”[22]
Nor have Poland’s hopes been realized for increased influence among its own neighbors. In relations with Moscow, Warsaw has been dismayed to find that it commands less – not more – respect than it did before the war, and that Russian leaders are more inclined to bypass Poland altogether and deal directly with EU “powerbrokers” France and Germany. In European politics, Warsaw is now widely seen as a disruptive, pro-American “fifth column” – as German newspapers put it, “America’s Trojan Donkey” – that is increasingly marginalized in important EU decision-making. A foretaste of the difficulties this may pose came in 2004, when anti-war EU member states tried to block Poland from gaining a seat on the Brussels General Directorate for International Relations – a move that then-Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rotfeld described as punishment for “taking views that don’t sit well with the larger EU members.”[23] A second – and even bitterer – taste came when Poland received a smaller-than-anticipated slice of the EU budget. The connection with the Iraq War was clear. “Behind closed doors,” one Polish lawmaker said, “The Germans and French told us, ‘if you’re such a close friend of America, you don’t need help from us, do you?’”[24]
In short, Poland has found itself, in the period since the start of the war, with the worst of both worlds: not a valued enough partner to reap the full benefits of its alliance with America, but close enough to Washington to attract the scorn of powerful neighbors. As one official said, “These are very sour grapes for Poland, very sour grapes indeed.”[25]
End of the Honeymoon?
From the perspective of America’s Central European allies, the costs of supporting the United States in Iraq appear to have exceeded the benefits. In exchange for unquestioning military and diplomatic support, regional powers feel they have achieved few of their own goals and little of lasting importance to the region. What they have gotten, officials say, is a sizeable war bill, a deaf ear in Washington, and political isolation in Europe.
This assessment – a common refrain in Polish newspapers – may come as a surprise in the United States, where officials insist they have made repeated efforts to address Central European concerns. Contrary to regional perceptions, U.S. officials say they gave Central European contractors a fair shake in the postwar bidding process.[26] Similarly, Pentagon officials reject the claim that they have neglected the needs of regional militaries, citing two consecutive supplemental aid packages worth $140 million – on top of the more than $80 million that the region has received in U.S. military funding since 2001.[27] Nor have U.S. lawmakers been deaf to Central European calls for visa reform: the U.S. Senate has unanimously passed a measure which, if successful, will allow for Polish inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program. As a makeweight to these efforts, the Bush Administration has used multiple, high-level visits with regional leaders – a remarkable 31 in the past three years – to communicate U.S. appreciation for Central European support in the war.[28]
But the message is not getting through – at either the popular or governmental level. For the vast majority of people in the region, Washington’s efforts to address regional concerns are not seen or talked about as often as the televised casualty reports, rejected visa applications, and scaled-back EU structural funds. In a recent poll, only 13 percent of Poles answered yes to the question, “Does U.S. foreign policy consider others’ interests?”[29] In the space of just three years, public approval of the United States has dropped by more than 25 percent in Poland.[30] If a poll could be conducted of government officials in these countries, a similar change would be found. Among regional policymakers, there is a growing suspicion that Washington is not inclined to take account of their interests when formulating U.S. policy. While welcoming recent U.S. attempts to address their concerns, Central European officials point out that these efforts came only after months of pressure at the highest levels – and even then did not include a full concession on a single issue. “After three years of war,” one Polish official said, “we have the same problems that we had at the beginning…We’re now on our third government since the start of the war, and all three have gone to Washington and come away empty-handed.”[31]
At both the popular and elite levels, the image of the United States that has emerged from the Iraq War is that of an opportunistic – even exploitive – power that takes, but does not give – a power that sees its allies as disposable assets which, while good to have in a time of crisis, are not worth making a serious effort to keep on board for the long haul.[32] This is a very different picture of the United States than that which fired imaginations in the region during the Cold War, when America was seen as a “benign and largely altruistic” force in world politics that – unlike other great powers – worked in unison with the national interests of its allies to advance the global public good.[33]
It was this widely-held image of the United States that motivated Central European capitals to align their foreign policies with Washington’s throughout the 1990s, and ultimately drove them to side with America in the Iraq crisis. And it is this image that was damaged – perhaps for good – by Central European experiences in the Iraq War. In its wake, the so-called “honeymoon” in U.S.-Central European relations – the period when the region’s powers automatically lined up behind Washington in the instinctive belief that it would be both right and in their interests to do so – appears to be over.[34] In its place is likely to emerge a more cautious relationship, in which American policymakers must work harder to enlist regional support for U.S. initiatives and Central Europeans, when asked, think harder before siding with the United States in an international crisis.
A Battle Worth Fighting
Left unaddressed, Central European disappointment over Iraq – while unlikely to cause a permanent rift in the relationship – is likely to change the way the region’s powers do business with the United States in at least three fundamental ways – each of which holds negative implications for American interests in the region and beyond.
Hard Bargaining. First, in light of their experiences in the Iraq War, future Central European governments are likely to adopt a more pragmatic, businesslike approach to the relationship with the United States. The main lesson that many regional leaders took away from the war was that, when dealing with Washington, they can no longer assume that supporting U.S. policy – and the values that underpin it – will necessarily produce greater U.S. support for their own goals and interests.[35] As a result, many Central Europeans have begun to argue that their governments should drive a harder bargain in exchange for supporting the United States in future crises, placing expected gains upfront and avoiding the tendency to base decisions on a vague, nostalgic affinity for America. “Prior to the Iraq War,” one Polish official said, “the basis for the relationship was largely sentimental. Poles saw the United States in almost romantic terms, and talked to it in terms of values. After the war, Poles talk strictly business.”[36]
U.S. policymakers have already begun to see signs of this new attitude – especially in their dealings with Poland, where Defense Minister Radek Sikorski has criticized the previous government for failing to extract a quid pro quo from Washington before the war and attempted to move the relationship to a more reciprocal footing.[37] An indication of how this could affect future relations came when Washington announced its intentions to construct missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. In sharp contrast to 2003, governments in these countries reacted cautiously, while their publics called on leaders to use the issue as an opportunity to leverage Washington for advantages (or as one writer put it, to trade “shield for visas”).[38]
From America’s perspective, this harder-nosed way of doing things is bad for one simple reason: it drives up the costs of Central European support – support that may be critical in determining the success of future U.S. ventures. Already, in the case of missile defense, the cool response that Washington received from Warsaw and Prague has forced the Pentagon to look once again to an increasingly skeptical Britain as a possible host for the bases. [39] Should the Central Europeans drop out altogether, the United States would lose what are arguably the best geographic sites for the system, depriving it of an essential, forward-based component in the shield that is necessary for protecting the eastern U.S. seaboard. It is not difficult to imagine how a similar scenario might affect America’s ability to recruit regional support in a future, Iraq-style military crisis. When Washington asked NATO for emergency reinforcements to hold the line in Afghanistan in September 2006, it was Poland – and Poland alone – that answered the call, sending 900 troops and possibly averting the collapse of the southern front in the campaign.[40] Had Warsaw temporized, waiting on an upfront gesture from Washington or further progress on visas, it is far from clear – outside of calling up additional American reserves – where NATO would have come up with the needed troops. As this example showed, America’s interests are best served when its Central European allies are instinctive, not conditional partners.
Looking to Brussels. A second trend in Central European politics after the Iraq War is likely to be an increasing tendency for the region’s countries to define their foreign policies according to the interests and preferences of the European Union, rather than those of the United States. As Central Europeans discovered in recent EU budget negotiations, being seen as a close ally of the United States – and opponent of France and Germany – can come at a steep price in intra-European politics. As time passes, this price is likely to get even steeper, as the eastward flow of EU subsidies and structural funds (which numbered more than $20 billion in 2004-2006) increases – and with it, the region’s dependence on Western neighbors (especially Germany) to fuel economic growth. Just as this process is raising the political influence (and popularity) of the EU to an all-time high in Central Europe, Washington’s perceived stinginess with military aid and visas will be pushing that of the United States to an all-time low. For every newspaper article describing the latest casualties in Iraq or complaining about the Bush Administration’s refusal to trade “shield for visas,” there will be a Polish farmer or Estonian fisherman receiving a subsidy check from Brussels, or a new highway or school being built with the EU’s label on it.[41]
Where this process is likely to lead is not difficult to surmise. Over time, hearts and minds are bound to follow the money, and Central Europeans are likely to look increasingly to Brussels (or Berlin) for political leadership and solutions to the region’s problems. Already, many Central Europeans feel that the EU has been more attentive to their post-Iraq wish list than the Bush Administration. When U.S. officials balked at Central European requests for visa reform, the EU came to their defense, calling on Washington to provide “equal visa treatment” to all EU citizens or risk a visa duty for Americans traveling to Europe. Coming after repeated Polish and Czech attempts to raise the issue in the United States, the EU’s vocal stance on behalf of its new members sent a powerful message to average Central Europeans that their “bread is buttered” in Brussels – not Washington. As more and more people in the region draw this conclusion, pressure will mount for the region’s governments to bring their policies in line with the European mainstream and avoid behavior that would run the risk of alienating them within the EU. The result is likely to be an eventual shift in the region’s foreign policies toward “a more traditional continental approach” that places less emphasis on building a UK-style “special relationship” with Washington.[42]
From an American perspective, a shift in Central Europe’s approach to the transatlantic relationship along these lines would damage U.S. interests in at least two ways: by decreasing the pool of allies upon which the United States can draw in future crises and by increasing the chances of future U.S. rivalry with the EU. A Poland that judges American requests for military assistance against the backdrop of French and German interests is a Poland that is less likely to provide support – support that, in the years ahead, will become more critical than ever as the United States confronts the challenges of an increasingly multipolar world.
While some degree of Central European reorientation toward the EU is inevitable and even desirable, the terms on which this shift occurs matter a great deal to the United States. With more than a quarter of the seats in the European Parliament and a third of the votes in the European Council, Central European countries represent a powerful bloc that has the potential to swing EU decisions in ways that will either reinforce or undermine U.S. interests on a range of important issues. The United States has no interest in seeing its Central European allies run into Brussels’ arms with a chip on their shoulders from the Iraq War. Such an outcome would strengthen the tenor of acrimony that already pervades European politics and weaken the foundations of Atlanticism in U.S.-EU relations.
Political Extremism. A third impact of the Iraq War on Central European politics may be an increase in the support base for anti-American parties in the region. As previously noted, America’s popularity has fallen dramatically in Central Europe in the past three years – a downturn which, according to Krzysztof Zagórski, Director of the Polish polling institute CBOS, is “undoubtedly connected to the experiences with the intervention in Iraq.”[43] This shift in public mood creates an opportunity for the grab bag of extremist parties in the region that are either ideologically opposed to American-style social and economic policies or simply have something to gain by capitalizing on the changing political winds. On the left, this includes unreformed communists like the Czech Communist Party (KSČM), who pine for a reversion to socialist economic policy and, in some cases, a closer foreign policy alignment with Russia.[44] On the right, it includes nationalists like the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), who combine the anti-capitalism of the left with a hyper-sensitivity to foreign encroachments on national sovereignty and traditional values.[45]
In both cases, these parties are able to use anti-Americanism to tap into the dangerous cocktail of rising unemployment, frustration with the political status quo, and distrust of the West that has cropped up in recent years in much the region.[46] The use of anti-Americanism in this way has been made easier by the political fallout over Iraq. In Slovakia, an alliance of left- and rightwing populists (a first in European history) won the 2006 elections on a platform consisting of three anti-U.S. planks: pulling Slovak troops out of Iraq, rolling back free market reforms, and moving the country’s foreign policy closer to that of Russia.[47] In the nearby Czech Republic, the unambiguously anti-American (and anti-NATO) Communist Party has gained unexpected strength in recent years and played a lead role in stirring public opposition to the proposed U.S. missile defense bases. And while overt anti-Americanism remains a political non-starter in Poland, the pro-Russian populist Self Defense Party (Samoobrona) has become increasingly effective at tapping into public opposition to the Iraq War, even going so far as to oppose the government’s plans to meet Washington’s request for Polish troops in Afghanistan – a move that would have been unthinkable before 2003.
In all three of these countries, the Iraq War has brought anti-Americanism a step closer to – and in the case of Slovakia, into – the political mainstream. While it remains a weak force in regional politics by Western European standards, the willingness of parties – even those on the fringe – to adopt anti-U.S. positions without fear of a voter backlash is itself a dramatic change from the period before the war, when anti-Americanism in any form was “not simply in bad taste, but politically dangerous.”[48]
To a greater extent than diplomatic hard bargaining or gravitation towards the EU, this strengthening of anti-American political sentiment in Central Europe poses a serious threat to U.S. interests in the region. Though a relatively minor force in regional politics for the time being, it has the potential – if allowed to continue its march into the mainstream – to bring about a fundamental reorientation of Central European economic and foreign policies in ways that would be destructive, not only for the United States, but for the region itself and Europe as a whole. Economically, the anti-capitalist impulse that is so tightly interwoven with anti-American populism represents a direct assault on the free market consensus that fueled Central Europe’s post-Communist recovery and growth, and that continues to make it an attractive venue for U.S. investment. Similarly, the nationalist and anti-Western rhetoric that mars the thinking of most extremist politicians is inherently antithetical to the prevailing internationalist, Atlanticist consensus – a consensus that has allowed for the region’s rapid assimilation, not only into NATO, but into the EU as well. The United States has no interest in seeing the regional consensus on these issues unraveled and replaced – as in the case of Slovakia – with policies that undermine the prosperity of the region’s economies and the stability and reliability of its governments.
Each of these three emerging trends – a more businesslike approach to the relationship with Washington, a greater tendency to look to the EU for leadership, and a stronger base of support for anti-American policies – represents a significant departure from the way Central European countries viewed and approached the United States in the period before the Iraq War. From an American perspective, the changes that these trends could eventually introduce – higher costs of cooperation, an eroded base of support in the EU, and a lurch towards populism – represent an unmistakable deterioration in the relationship that could hold negative, long-term implications for U.S. interests.
Taken together, they make the region’s powers less likely to host U.S. missile bases or support the United States in the next Iraq-style crisis, more likely to take a confrontational approach toward Washington when their turns come for the rotating EU presidency, and more likely to repeal free market reforms that came “wrapped in the American flag.”[49] In short, the United States stands to lose a great deal from “losing the New Europe” and gain a great deal from keeping it in the pro-American fold. The battle for the hearts and minds of Central Europeans is a battle worth fighting.
A Window of Opportunity
This article has argued that U.S.-Central European relations have been damaged by the perception of U.S. ingratitude for regional contributions to the war in Iraq; that this has occurred despite U.S. efforts to address its allies’ concerns; and that, in light of Central Europe’s importance to America, Washington has a vested interest in seeing that this damage not become permanent. Assuming that this assessment is correct, what should be done about it? What, if anything, should the United States do to “mend fences” with its Central European allies? Two responses are called for – one to address regional concerns at the short-term, tactical level and another to address larger questions about the status of the relationship at the long-term, strategic level.
Winning Hearts and Minds
First of all, U.S. policymakers must do more to publicize the efforts they have made to lessen the costs of the war for Central European allies, and make further attempts – where possible – to address areas of outstanding concern. The first of these is especially important for winning the hearts and minds of the Central European public. Rumors abound in Polish newspapers about Poles being mistreated by U.S. border guards, but little is said about increased aid packages or progress on visa reform – a problem that is compounded by the fact that there is not a single U.S. media correspondent permanently based in Warsaw.[50]
A similarly distorted picture has developed amongst public intellectuals and policy analysts in the region – a growing number of which have begun to favor a more distinctly Euro-federalist (and less Atlanticist) course in their countries’ foreign policies.[51] Even many relatively high-ranking Central European diplomats and policymakers have been surprised to hear – in conversations with the author – of the extent of U.S. efforts to redress regional grievances. Clearly, a more effective public diplomacy is needed if the United States is to salvage its image in the region.
In addition to selling itself better, Washington should also seek to make further headway on those agenda items where a lack of progress continues to stoke regional frustrations. As previously noted, the United States has yet to grant a full concession on any single request that regional powers have made in the period since the start of the war. Of these, the one that continues to do the most to sour the relationship is visas. In principle, U.S. policymakers should not be averse to changing U.S. visa policy – even in fundamental ways – if it means retaining the support of key allies like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. As EU member states, these countries already have access to Western labor markets and are therefore unlikely to abuse a more open system in the United States. While significant bureaucratic hurdles remain to be cleared, the positive reaction of U.S. lawmakers to extending the Visa Waiver Program (on a probationary basis) to include Poland – together with the fact that the latest legislation takes account of lingering State Department concerns – suggests that movement on this issue may be lower-hanging fruit than is commonly supposed. A renewed congressional push should be made after the 2006 midterm elections, and should include: (a) a commitment-free time table for extending the waiver, (b) efforts to broaden the scope of current legislation to include regional partners other than just Poland, and© if necessary, a reexamination of the visa law itself.[52] Doing so would go a long way toward regaining Central European confidence at all levels.
Whether or not it takes the form of further action on visas, the key is that Washington must do something to signal its appreciation to regional partners in a very visible way, and soon. As straightforward as this recommendation may seem, doing so will require a major adjustment to current U.S. thinking about the role that quid pro quos should play in relations with Central Europeans and other key allies. Two views predominate. The first is that the United States has already done enough for its friends in the region, and that – to the extent regional capitals want more – they should “get over it.” This view is reminiscent of British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s famous comment, made to the Romanians after their betrayal by Russia in the war against Turkey, that, “In politics, ingratitude is often the reward of the greatest services.” As it did to the Romanians in 1878, this approach would likely alienate today’s Central Europeans and remove incentives for future cooperation.
A second, more prevalent, view is that Washington’s reluctance to place its relations with Central Europeans on a more reciprocal footing is itself a reward – an upgrade in the status of the relationship to a more “mature” (and less extractive) partnership of the sort that characterizes U.S. relations with major Western European allies.[53] On this view, Central European powers will only be taken seriously in Washington when they no longer seek direct benefits for supporting U.S. policies. This notion – which is widely held in the U.S. foreign policy establishment – emphasizes the “intangible” benefits that accrue to the shortlist of countries that are seen as America’s closest allies, and seeks to move U.S.-Central European relations away from the kind of tit-for-tat bargaining that occurs in Washington’s dealings with, say, Egypt.
There is considerable merit to this view. The problem is that no one seems to have adequately explained to the Central Europeans that things work this way. A tacit bond between trusted colleagues can look an awful lot like a cold shoulder. This is especially dangerous for regional politicians, who – if they are to stay in office and continue implementing pro-U.S. policies – need to be able to show increasingly skeptical constituencies tangible evidence of the benefits of the relationship. As one Polish parliamentarian said:
We need symbolic proof of the supposed special relationship between the U.S. and Poland. If it’s visas, great…If it’s a new frigate for the Polish navy, great. I don’t want this to sound like horse trading, but as politicians, we have to show our citizens that we’re getting something out of the relationship.[54]
This logic – a fundamental tenet of politics anywhere – is especially strong in Central Europe in the wake of the region’s accession to the EU, where, in order to succeed, member states must become masters of the give-and-take of political bargaining. In this environment, quid pro quos of the sort sought after by regional governments in U.S.-Central European relations after Iraq are given and expected as a matter of course. Shifting back and forth from this way of doing business to the kind of “mature,” non-reciprocal approach favored in Washington may be a challenge for countries in the region. This is a vital point for U.S. officials to understand when sitting down at the negotiating table with Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague. While the overall goal should still be to move the relationship toward the level of trust that exists in U.S.-Western European relations, U.S. policymakers must recognize that doing so takes time and that this process is aided, not hindered, by an occasional quid pro quo along the way.
Strategic Commitment
Washington’s attempts to shore up bilateral relations with its Central European allies, while important, will be incomplete unless they come as part of a larger effort at clarifying and communicating America’s intentions in the region at a more fundamental, strategic level. This is especially critical with regard to Poland, where policymakers had hoped to emerge from the Iraq War as America’s primary partner on the European mainland, but have been disappointed by what they see as the continuing centrality of Germany in U.S. policy in Europe.
The solution to this problem lies – at least in part – in simply communicating to Warsaw the privileged position that it already holds in U.S. thinking on the region. Most U.S. officials concede Poland’s emerging status as a closely-aligned, mid-sized power with regional and even extra-regional interests (and capabilities to match) and would agree that a gesture from Washington acknowledging its increasing role in U.S. global strategy is in order.[55] Such an expression could take many forms, including a bilateral U.S.-Polish defense agreement – a possibility that attracted some attention during Polish President Lech Kaczyński’s September 2006 visit to Washington.[56]
However, beyond a symbolic expression of this kind, U.S. policymakers should go no further until they have developed a more precise picture of how Poland and its neighbors fit into the larger design of future U.S. strategy in Europe and beyond – a task that has been made more urgent (and more challenging) by recent changes to the European geopolitical landscape – e.g., the apparent breakdown of European integration, the emergence of a more independent and outward-looking German foreign policy, and an increasingly assertive Russia. It is with this larger canvass in mind that American leaders must define future U.S. goals and interests as they relate to Central Europe.
Bearing in mind that the relationship between the United States and Poland will likely always bear the marks of an asymmetric relationship between a global and regional power, several fundamental questions present themselves. What does the United States ultimately want out of Central Europe and how can Poland help accomplish that goal? Does Washington still expect Germany to play its traditional role as the anchor in transatlantic relations? If not, is this a role that Poland – with its limited resources, sometimes turbulent politics, and insular worldview – can play? Is it a role that Poland wants to play? Finally, assuming that the answer to the last two questions is “yes,” how would a closer U.S. relationship with Poland – with its heightened threat perception of Russia – affect Washington’s ability to cooperate with Moscow in accomplishing important goals in other parts of the world?
Conclusion
In answering these questions, U.S. policymakers are likely to find that America’s Central European allies do indeed have a positive – and surprisingly prominent – role to play in sustaining a constructive U.S. presence in Europe and supporting American leadership in the wider international arena. But if they are to play this part, Washington must take steps to undo the damage done by the Iraq War. Already, Central Europeans are less firmly in the Atlanticist fold than they were ten (or even five) years ago; in another ten, it is far from certain whether they will be as inclined to take the kind of risks in support of U.S. policy that they took in 2003. As the Polish Ambassador recently said, “If the United States takes the pro-American position of its Central European allies for granted, it may lose it. But if the United States cultivates this reservoir of goodwill, this doesn’t have to happen.”[57]
Clearly, a window of opportunity exists for the United States to regain the confidence of its allies in the region and rally their support for the future. The good news is that this can still be done relatively cheaply. At the tactical level, a more open visa policy – together with an active PR campaign – would work wonders for America’s image in the region, making it easier for pro-American politicians to hold the center against extremism. At the strategic level, a gesture acknowledging Poland’s special status in Washington would salve Warsaw’s fears of isolation, making it less inclined to drive hard bargains for future support and more inclined to use its position in the EU to America’s benefit. At both levels, the mere appearance of greater efforts on Washington’s part would help resuscitate America’s image as a credible leader in the region – a big power that still does big things for big reasons, and does them well.
In all of this, America’s leaders would be wise to consider the lessons that this episode in U.S.-Central European relations presents for how the United States manages its alliances in other parts of the globe. Perhaps the clearest of these is that ideals alone are not sufficient to cement an alliance: even the closest of friendships will fray if not continuously and actively cultivated. Now, as in the Cold War, it is “not enough to preach the virtues of democracy and freedom;” America’s allies must see that aligning with the United States brings real, tangible benefits.[58] No matter how powerful a state becomes or how lofty the ideals that inspire it, its leaders must still engage in the age-old task of “winning friends and influencing people.” While doing this may have seemed less important when the United States was the only game in town, it is likely to prove crucial in the years ahead, as the number of powerful players in the international system – and range of options for U.S. allies – increases. By learning to more effectively manage alliances in a place like Central Europe, where the reservoir of goodwill for the United States runs deep and the margin of error for U.S. mistakes is wide, Washington may be able to avoid making similar mistakes in the future in places where it is less likely to get a second chance.
Wess Mitchell is the director of research at the Center for European Policy Analysis, where he regularly authors reports on European politics and transatlantic relations. His research on U.S.-Central European relations has been translated into Polish and Czech and published in European political journals.
The Center for European Policy Analysis is a Washington, DC-based non-profit, non-partisan public policy research institute dedicated to the study of Central Europe. An affiliate of the National Center for Policy Analysis, CEPA provides a forum for scholarly research, writing, and debate on key issues affecting the countries and economies of the Central European region, their membership in the European Union (EU), and relationship with the United States.
Endnotes:
[1] See for example Marcin Zaborowski, “From America’s Protégé to Constructive European: Polish Security Policy in the Twenty-First Century,” EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2004 and Mark K. Melamed, “Polish American Relations in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq,” The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2 (15), pp. 7-21.
[2] Taken from Radek Sikorski, “Losing the New Europe,” The Washington Post, November 7, 2003.
[3] Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard, “Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction,” Congressional Research Service Report, July 7, 2006.
[4] The figure given for Central European military personnel refers to boots on the ground at any given time. If all soldiers rotating through Iraq are included, the Polish figure alone climbs to 10,500. The financial figure is an estimate. According to the Polish Ministry of Defense, Polish war costs have so far amounted to $260 million in direct military spending alone. Extrapolating from Poland’s costs and using available data, the costs for other regional powers can be roughly estimated at: $8.4 million for Czech Republic, $17.5 million for Hungary, $10.8 million for Slovakia, $68.6 million for Romania, $38 million for Bulgaria, $14.1 million for Latvia, $5.3 million for Lithuania, and $3.7 million for Estonia.
[5] Melamed, p. 8.
[6] Author’s conversations with Polish officials. When asked by a reporter why Poland had gone to war alongside the United States, then-Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski replied, “We are doing something that is in favor of basic values, basic fundamental issues, not finances…If Iraq finally will be [an] independent, democratic state, then that is the highest reward which we can expect.”
[7] Author’s conversations with Polish officials. See also Radek Sikorski, “Losing the New Europe.”
[8] “Polish Spoils?” Warsaw Voice, April 17, 2003.
[9] Erzsébet N. Rózsa, “Whose ‘Brothers in Arms’? Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria Face the Iraq Divide in Trans-Atlantic Relations,” 2003, p. 16.
[10] “Polish Group Bumar Negotiating Iraq Arms Contract,” Defense News, August 30, 2004.
[11] For a discussion of Iraqi debt forgiveness, see Martin A. Weiss, “Iraq’s Debt Forgiveness: Procedure and Potential Implications for International Debt Relief,” Congressional Research Service Report, April 21, 2006.
[12] Rózsa, p. 16.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Radek Sikorski, “Defense Reform in Europe: The Case of Poland,” European Outlook, American Enterprise Institute, August 10, 2005. Sikorski’s estimates for Polish spending on Iraq are somewhat higher than those provided by the Polish Ministry of Defense.
[15] Author’s conversation with Polish official.
[16] Author’s conversations with U.S. officials.
[17] Slovak Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda asked President Bush about visas during the latter’s visit to Bratislava in February 2004; the Presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania asked about it in May 2005; Romanian President Traian Băsescu mentioned it in July 2006.
[18] Petr Schnur, Právo, August 9, 2006 as quoted in The Prague Post, August 16, 2006.
[19] Author’s conversations with Polish officials, parliamentarians, and analysts.
[20] A Polish official told the author, “We genuinely thought we were going to be closer to Washington – especially after standing beside her when no one else would.”
[21] Author’s conversations with Polish officials, including Paweł Zalewski, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish Sejm, September 5, 2006..
[22] Author’s conversation with Olaf Osica, Research Fellow, European Centre Natolin, August 23, 2006.
[23] Der Spiegel interview with Adam Rotfeld, “Iraq War Offers Painful Lesson for Warsaw,” February 28, 2005.
[24] Author’s conversation with Polish parliamentarian.
[25] Author’s conversation with Polish official.
[26] Author’s conversations with U.S. officials.
[27] As one U.S. official told the author, “the United States realizes that there was a cost for Poland [in going to war in Iraq]…a lot of people in Washington scrambled to get that extra funding.” It is important to note that the United States absorbed the full costs of transporting, feeding, and housing Central European forces deployed in the war zone. See “Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,” FY01-06.
[28] This figure includes visits between President Bush and regional heads of state or government, and breaks down as follows: Poland, six; Czech Republic, four; Slovakia, three; Hungary, three; Slovenia, one; Latvia, three; Lithuania, two; Estonia, one; Romania, three; and Bulgaria, five.
[29] Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 23, 2005.
[30] Transatlantic Trends, Topline Report, 2006.
[31] Author’s conversation with Polish parliamentarian.
[32] A recent editorial in Rzeczpospolita (one of Poland’s most respected newspapers) said, “Talking to the Americans is hard. Whatever we would like to achieve through negotiations, it generally turns out that it is they who have all the aces in their hand.” See Marek Magierowski, “Przyjaźń i racjonalność” [“Friendship and Rationality”] Rzeczpospolita, August 16, 2006.
[33] Ronald Asmus, “The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, July 2005, pp. 204-5.
[34] Thomas Schreibner, “Lobby Polonaise,” Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2004.
[35] Author’s conversations with Polish officials.
[36] Another official said, “People in Poland are bored by talk of common values, principles, speeches. The United States is not trusted by Poles anymore.”
[37] Author’s conversations with U.S. officials. See also Judy Dempsey, “Poland Will Set Own Course, Defense Chief Vows,” January 24, 2006.
[38] Marek Magierowski, “Przyjaźń i racjonalność” [“Friendship and Rationality”]” and Rob Cameron, “First Signs of Discontent over U.S. Missile Interceptor Base,” Radio Prague, August 15, 2006.
[39] Tom Baldwin, “U.S. Turns Back to Britain as its Base for Son of Star Wars,” The London Times, August 16, 2006.
[40] Daniel Dombey, Stephen Fidler, and Jan Cienski, “Nato Looks to Warsaw for Afghan Deployment,” The Financial Times, September 13, 2006.
[41] Sikorski, “Losing the New Europe.”
[42] Melamed, p. 19.
[43] “Jak bardzo lubimy Amerykę” [“Why We Like America”], Rzeczpospolita, August 7, 2006.
[44] For a fuller discussion of Central European political parties, see Janusz Bugajski and Ilona Teleki, America’s New Allies: Central-Eastern Europe and the Transatlantic Link (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), pp. 68-9.
[45] Borbala Kriza, “Anti-Americanism and Right-Wing Populism in Eastern Europe: The Case of Hungary,” Paper presented at the Kokkalis Workshop, Harvard University, February 6, 2004.
[46] Ibid. See Ivan Krastev, “The Anti-American Century?” Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 2, April 2004.
[47] As Robert Fico, the new Slovak Prime Minister, said shortly before the elections, his aim was to change the “totally U.S.-oriented” policies of the outgoing government (which he said had made Slovakia “state number fifty-two of the United States”) and bring “balance” to the country’s foreign policy by strengthening its relations with Russia.
[48] Kriza, p. 2.
[49] One Polish policymaker told the author, “If a war similar to Iraq took place tomorrow, Poland probably would be hesitant to participate in it.” On the third point, see Kriza, p. 2.
[50] Interview with Tomasz Wróblewski, editor-in-chief of the Polish edition of Newsweek, in Michele Kelemen, “Polish People Angry About Being Fingerprinted and Photographed When Entering the US,” European Outlook, January 27, 2004. A typical story reported that Polish actors had been barred from working on Broadway; another, that Polish students were being deported in handcuffs.
[51] One common misconception among many Polish analysts is the belief that the United States failed to deliver on its promise of increased military aid to Poland in early 2005. See for example Melamed, p. 12.
[52] Current legislation is worded to include only those countries that supplied more than 300 troops to the war in Iraq – an arbitrary distinction that limits the bill’s applicability solely to Poland.
[53] Author’s conversations with current and former U.S. officials.
[54] Author’s conversation with Polish parliamentarian.
[55] Author’s conversations with current and former U.S. officials.
[56] Jim Wolf, “Poland Wants U.S. Pact in Exchange for Missile Silos,” Reuters, September 13, 2006.
[57] Author’s conversation with Polish Ambassador Janusz Reiter July 6, 2006.
[58] Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman , Ethical Realism: A Vision For America’s Role in the World (New York: Pantheon Books), 2006, p. 31.
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